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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, three years after massacring twelve innocent people
and injuring seventy more in a Colorado movie theater, James
Holmes was on trial for his life.1 Close to 3,000 pieces of evidence
and more than 300 witnesses convinced prosecuting District
Attorney George H. Brauchler that Holmes’ case, which took three
months to try, “cried out for the death penalty.”2 Yet, after a mere
seven hours of deliberation, Holmes received the default sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole when jurors
were unable to reach a unanimous verdict.3 Nine jurors voted in
favor of the death sentence; two jurors remained uncertain; and one
juror explicitly refused to cast a vote for death.4 Holmes’ narrow
escape from the “ultimate punishment” was not the product of good
luck, however.5 Rather, his life sentence was the calculated result
of an intricate capital defense strategy colloquially known as the

1. Elisha Fieldstadt & Jacob Rascon, Aurora Movie Theater Shooter James
Holmes to Be Sentenced to Life in Prison, NBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015),
nbcnews.com/news/us-news/aurora-movie-theater-shooter-james-holmes-besentenced-life-prison-n406276 [perma.cc/VK9G-4JT7]. On July 20, 2012, just
“minutes into a special midnight screening of ‘The Dark Knight Rises,’” twentyfour-year-old James Holmes, “encased in armor, his hair tinted orange, a gas
mask obscuring his face, stepped through the emergency exit of a sold-out movie
theater . . . and opened fire.” Erica Goode et al., Before Gunfire, Hints of ‘Bad
News’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012), nytimes.com/2012/08/27/us/before-gunfirein-colorado-theater-hints-of-bad-news-about-james-holmes.html
[perma.cc/LM6C-8T5V]. “By the time it was over, there were 12 dead and 58
wounded.” Id.
2. Maria L. La Ganga, James Holmes prosecutor talks about the one holdout
juror who spared the killer’s life, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015),
www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-holmes-da-qa-20150824-story.html
[perma.cc/6BCA-TYHC].
3. Ken Broda-Bahm, Build Resistant Jurors: Lessons from the Aurora
Theater
Trial,
PERSUASIVE
LITIGATOR
(Aug.
13,
2015),
persuasivelitigator.com/2015/08/build_resistant_jurors.html [perma.cc/86LNR7ES] [hereinafter Broda-Bahm I].
4. Id.
5. Ephrat Livni, The Pittsburgh shooter may become the second American to
face death for a federal hate crime, QUARTZ (Oct. 29, 2018),
qz.com/1441826/pittsburgh-shooter-may-face-the-death-penalty-for-a-federalhate-crime/ [perma.cc/HU2N-VEH6].
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Colorado Method.6
Four years later, the Colorado Method worked its magic
again in the trial of Brendt Christensen.7 In October 2017, after a
federal grand jury indicted Christensen with one count of
kidnapping resulting in death and two counts of making false
statements to the FBI,8 Christensen was on trial for his life9 in
Peoria, Illinois.10 Matthew Rubenstein, director of the Capital
6. Jack Healy, Aurora Gunman’s Mental State Poses Test for Jury Weighing
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), nytimes.com/2015/07/23/us/auroragunmans-mental-state-poses-test-for-jury-weighing-death-penalty.html
[perma.cc/HX77-46WU]. At its core, the Colorado Method is simply a jury
selection strategy “devised to prevent death sentences.” Susan Greene, Inside
the small legal community defending Colorado death penalty clients, a wary
hope
for
repeal,
COLO.
INDEP.
(Feb.
21,
2020),
coloradoindependent.com/2020/02/21/death-penalty-abolition-capital-defenses/
[perma.cc/582R-45W3].
7. The author was a second-year law student and judicial intern for the Hon.
James E. Shadid during the capital trial of Brendt Christensen in 2019. As a
result, the author was privy to the juror selection process and witnessed the
Colorado Method at work. She therefore formulates a lot of the opinions herein
from that first-hand experience.
8. In July of 2017, Brendt Christensen was initially indicted with one count
of kidnapping, which alleged that he “willfully and unlawfully seized, confined,
inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, and carried away [Yingying Zhang],
and otherwise held her for his own benefit and purpose” in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1) (2021). Indictment at 1, United States v. Christensen, No. 17-20037
(C.D. Ill. July 12, 2017). The indictment also charged that Christensen “used
and caused to be used a means, facility, and instrumentality of interstate
commerce, namely, a Motorola cellular telephone and a Saturn Astra motor
vehicle, in committing and in furtherance of the commission of the offense.” Id.
Later, in October 2017, a superseding indictment added two counts of making
false statements to FBI Special Agents Anthony Manganaro, Joel Smith, and
Michael Carter, and modified the kidnapping charge to “Kidnapping Resulting
in Death.” Superseding Indictment at 1–3, United States v. Christensen, No.
17-20037 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2017). The superseding indictment also included
notice of eight special findings, including that Christensen “[i]ntentionally
killed” Zhang “in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, in that it
involved torture or serious physical abuse,” and that the killing was done “after
substantial planning and premeditation[.]” Id. at 3–4.
9. The Government issued a Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death on
January 19, 2018, citing statutory aggravating factors of death during
commission of another crime, heinous, cruel, or depraved manner of committing
the offense, and substantial planning and premeditation. Notice of Intent to
Seek a Sentence of Death at 2–3, United States v. Christensen, No. 17-20037
(C.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2018). The Notice also listed six non-statutory aggravating
factors: victim impact evidence, future danger of the defendant, lack of remorse,
other serious acts of violence, vulnerability of victim, and obstruction. Id. at 3–
4.
10. U.S. ATT’Y OFF. CENT. DIST. ILL., Grand Jury Returns Superseding
Indictment that Charges Champaign Man with Kidnapping Resulting in Death,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 3, 2017), justice.gov/usao-cdil/pr/grand-jury-returnssuperseding-indictment-charges-champaign-man-kidnapping-resulting.
Although Christensen was indicted in the Urbana Division of the Central
District of Illinois, his request to transfer the venue to the Peoria Division of

250

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:1

Resource Counsel Project, joined Christensen’s defense team as a
jury consultant on January 18, 2019.11 Rubenstein brought with
him the Colorado Method, a “highly sophisticated” and “particularly
effective” instrument of jury selection.12
Rubenstein and the Colorado Method would soon become
Brendt Christensen’s saving grace, just as it was for James Holmes
and countless more defendants facing the death penalty.13
Christensen was ultimately found guilty of kidnapping, sexually
assaulting, and torturing twenty-six-year-old Yingying Zhang, a
Chinese visiting scholar at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign.14 A wire-recorded confession from Christensen
revealed that, after choking and raping her, he murdered Zhang by
beating her with a baseball bat, stabbing her, and eventually
decapitating her.15 Zhang’s remains have yet to, and likely never
the Central District of Illinois was granted on December 6, 2018, due to pretrial
publicity, docket management, courthouse space, and promptness concerns.
Order and Opinion at 4, United States v. Christensen, No. 17-20037 (C.D. Ill.
Dec. 6, 2018).
11. Entry of Appearance for Defendant at 1, United States v. Christensen,
No. 17-20037 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2019). Although not mandated, the use of jury
consultants in capital cases has increased over the years. Ben Zigterman,
Christensen trial |Both sides utilizing consultants to try to stack jury, NEWSGAZETTE (June 9, 2019), news-gazette.com/news/christensen-trial-both-sidesutilizing-consultants-to-try-to-stack/article_0c11ec35-0c3f-5fa8-8c5c211ac8c46544.html [perma.cc/8VGD-9YQG]. James Acker, a professor at the
University at Albany’s School of Criminal Justice, noted that it would be
strange nowadays if a jury consultant was not involved for a death-eligible case.
Id. (statement of James Acker). Jury consultants have been found to be
immensely beneficial to any trial attorney, specifically because their expertise
in social science, psychology, and statistics allows them to strategize a tailored
approach to whatever trial they face. Selecting a jury can be complicated during
divisive political times, AM. BAR ASSOC. (June 2018), americanbar.org/
news/abanews/publications/youraba/2018/june-2018/selecting-a-jury-can-becomplicated-during-divisive-political-ti/ [perma.cc/W26C-S9W4]. For more
information on Matthew Rubenstein, the jury consultant for Brendt
Christensen, see Matthew Rubenstein, FED. DEATH PENALTY RES. COUNS.,
fdprc.capdefnet.org/project-staff/matthew-rubenstein [perma.cc/DPW8-5CKM]
(last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
12. Brandon Garrett, Daniel Krauss, & Nicholas Scurich, Capital Jurors in
an Era of Death Penalty Decline, 126 YALE L.J. F. 417, 428 (Mar. 6, 2017).
13. David Wymore currently holds the Colorado Method in propriety and, as
such, specific information about the method is limited. Janae M. Lepir,
Hypothetically Speaking: The Constitutional Parameters of Capital Voir Dire in
the Military after Morgan v. Illinois, 225 MIL. L. REV. 375, 397 (2017).
Accordingly, it is difficult to estimate how many capital defendants have
received life sentences because of it.
14. Jamie Munks, Judge sentences U. of I. killer Brendt Christensen to life
in prison after jury unable to decide on death sentence, CHI. TRIB. (July 18,
2019),
chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-brendt-christensenyingying-zhang-death-penalty-20190718-hkypbggymfexdef2eqgmxpa3sestory.html [perma.cc/44FY-NYAB]; Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1, United
States v. Christensen, No. 17-20037 (C.D. Ill. July 19, 2019).
15. Andrea Reiher, Man’s Girlfriend Wore an FBI Wire to Get His Rape &
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will, be found.16 Despite the uncontested heinousness of these
crimes, Christensen was spared the death penalty and sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after two of the
twelve jurors were unable to render a unanimous decision regarding
a potential death sentence.17 Shockingly, Christensen’s defense
team even admitted his guilt in their opening statements,18 further
underscoring the Colorado Method’s effectiveness; even when the
abhorrent facts are undisputed — worse, highlighted — the
Colorado Method provides an escape from death.
Currently, the only way to effectively learn the Colorado
Method is by attending a “Colorado Method voir dire seminar.”19
Murder Confession, HEAVY (June 12, 2020), heavy.com/entertainment/
2020/06/brendt-christensen-yingying-zhang-murder-fbi-wire/ [perma.cc/8XZA66ZQ].
16. Matt Masterson, Finding Yingying Zhang’s Remains ‘May Be Impossible’
Family Says After New Details Surface, WTTW NEWS (Aug. 7, 2019),
news.wttw.com/2019/08/07/brendt-christensen-offers-information-yingyingzhang-remains [perma.cc/49NS-Q3BJ]. In November 2018, under an immunity
agreement, Christensen revealed to prosecutors that, after killing her, he placed
Zhang’s “butchered body in three separate garbage bags, which he tossed in a
dumpster outside his Champaign apartment before disposing of her personal
items among trash receptacles around the Champaign-Urbana area.” Id. This
means that recovering Zhang’s remains “may be impossible as investigators
believe the size of Zhang’s remains by now could be ‘smaller than a cellphone.’”
Id.
17. High-Profile Federal Death-Penalty Trial of Brendt Christensen Ends in
Life
Sentence,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(July
22,
2019),
deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/high-profile-federal-death-penalty-trial-of-brendtchristensen-ends-in-life-sentence [perma.cc/4SWU-5HD8]. Judge Shadid’s
remarks as he sentenced Christensen remain profound:
As for the defendant, the jury has been unable to reach a unanimous
decision. In deliberating some jurors thought death was appropriate and
at least one thought it wasn’t. That means by law I must impose on you
a sentence of life without release in the Bureau of Prisons. There should
be no second guessing the decision of a jury. It is a cornerstone of our
system. The mercy extended to you by the jury is a testament to their
humanity and not your character.
James E. Shadid, Closing Remarks at Christensen Sentencing (July 18,
2019) (transcript on file with author).
18. Jamie Munks, In opening statement, attorney admits Brendt Christensen
abducted, killed Chinese scholar at University of Illinois, CHI. TRIB. (June 12,
2019),
chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-u-of-i-chinese-studentkidnapping-openings-20190611-story.html
[web.archive.org/web/20210116071021/https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/b
reaking/ct-met-u-of-i-chinese-student-kidnapping-openings-20190611story.html]. The defense team admitting Christensen’s guilt was certainly a
surprise for everyone in the courtroom, although it later made perfect sense
considering the Colorado Method’s prioritization of mitigating evidence.
19. Matthew Rubenstein, Overview of the Colorado Method of Capital Voir
Dire, 34 CHAMPION 18, 27 (2010). Because Wymore has expertly managed to
keep his teachings of the Colorado Method private, Lepir, supra note 13,
Rubenstein’s article remains the most comprehensive source regarding the
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However, these seminars cost hundreds of dollars to attend and only
occur once or twice a year, making accessible literature on the
technique scarce.20 Accordingly, the need to publicize this successful
strategy is more than warranted. In undertaking an examination of
the Colorado Method’s effectiveness, this Comment proceeds in
three main parts: Part II breaks down the relevant history of the
American death penalty and its procedures before introducing the
Colorado Method; Part III explores the well-documented
controversy surrounding capital jury selection before assessing the
advantages and disadvantages of utilizing the Colorado Method;
finally, Part IV advocates for achievable modifications to the
Colorado Method. Considering that Colorado’s “public defender
system is one of the strongest in the nation,” its namesake method
surely deserves national attention.21

II. BACKGROUND
To say that death penalty jurisprudence is complicated would
be a massive understatement, but a certain understanding of its
parameters is required before moving forward. The Background of
this Comment aims to offer that understanding by exploring, first,
the history and procedures of the federal death penalty, second, the
structure of capital jury selection, and third, the five stages of the
Colorado Method of capital jury selection.

A. The Death Penalty
The ins and outs of capital punishment are difficult to grasp
for a number of reasons, particularly because the “United States is
not one single place when it comes to the death penalty.”22 For
example, during open-court voir dire for the Christensen jury in
June 2019, one potential juror questioned “how a conviction could
carry the death penalty in Illinois when the state struck capital
punishment from its statutes years ago.”23 Judge James E. Shadid
of the Central District of Illinois explained how Christensen’s case
Method and thus is frequently cited herein.
20. Kathryn J. Stimson et al., Six of the Greatest: Outstanding Lawyers in
Colorado History, 44 COLO. LAW. 34, 36 (July 2015) (stating “lawyers travel
annually to Boulder to attend the National College of Capital Voir Dire to learn
and practice the Colorado Method.”).
21. Greene, supra note 6.
22. DAVID GARLAND, EMBASSY OF U.S. OF AM., WHY DOES THE U.S. HAVE
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 1 (May 2012) (available at photos.state.gov/
libraries/amgov/133183/english/P_You_Asked_WhyCapitalPunishment_Englis
h.pdf).
23. Michael Tarm, Death-penalty trial panned in state that ended
punishment,
AP
NEWS
(June
10,
2019),
apnews.com/
d95a57e3616c4d8f8a46811f3c1b02de [perma.cc/TVD5-62MA].
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was a “rare instance of the U.S. Department of Justice seeking the
death penalty in one of the more than 20 states” that abolished
capital punishment.24 As Justice Stewart elucidated in 1972, this is
not the only unique aspect of America’s capital punishment scheme:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its complete
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique,
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our
concept of humanity.25

Further, the history of capital punishment in the United
States is convoluted and disappointingly “intertwined with slavery,
segregation, and social reform movements.”26 It is no surprise that
“the discretionary use of the death penalty” in America has been
recognized as “a decision which no human should be called upon to
make.”27 Even the Supreme Court has yet to master America’s
capital punishment scheme, resulting in a “zig-zag pattern of
renouncing, requiring, and then relaxing statutory guidance” with
regard to death penalty jurisprudence.28 Thus, comprehending the
controversiality of the death penalty’s history and current
procedures is necessary to grasp why improving the system is so
critical.29
Initially, the first-known death penalty laws were codified in
1700s B.C. in the Code of King Hammurabi of Babylon, which
enumerated twenty-five crimes punishable by death.30 Then, in the
24. Id. The Christensen case is a clear illustration of how a state’s abolition
of capital punishment “does not impede the federal government from applying
the death penalty to a prisoner from that state.” Kelley Czajka, How Does the
Federal Death Penalty Work?, PAC. STANDARD (July 25, 2019),
psmag.com/news/how-does-the-federal-death-penalty-work [perma.cc/N8EGKNPM].
25. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. History of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., (Nov. 29,
2017),
deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-penalty
[perma.cc/SV73-HNU5]. Undoubtedly, the road to modern-day death penalty
jurisprudence is as long as it is brutal. Death Penalty Issues, CAL. INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
californiainnocenceproject.org/issues-we-face/death-penalty/
[perma.cc/874W-D7X5] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
27. William J. Bowers & Wanda D. Foglia, Still Singularly Agonizing: Law’s
Failure to Purge Arbitrariness from Capital Sentencing, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 51,
53 (2003).
28. William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1044–45 (1995).
29. It must be noted that, with regard to the death penalty, this comment
“paints with a broad brush, and as a result, many important issues have not
received the attention they deserve.” MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW 15 (2012). Accordingly, many important facets of death penalty
jurisprudence are not discussed herein.
30. Early Death Penalty Laws, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 5, 2019),
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1600s, British colonizers brought the practice of capital punishment
with them to America.31 The first documented American execution
took place in Virginia in 1608,32 and by the onset of the American
Revolution in 1775, all thirteen colonies utilized their own statutory
death penalties.33
The federal death penalty, however, was not established until
the Punishment of Crimes Act (“Crimes Act”) was enacted by the
First U.S. Congress in 1790.34 The Crimes Act became the first
comprehensive list of federal offenses, listing twenty-three federal
crimes, seven of which were punishable by death.35 Its passage not
only signaled the beginning of a dually-operating set of capital
punishment laws, but also represented a much-needed shift away
from the “colonial-era tendency to make the death penalty
mandatory for all serious crimes.”36
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court began tackling some
of the legal parameters of who could “take a human life in the name
of justice” and when they could do so.37 In Witherspoon v. Illinois,
the Court limited death penalty jurisprudence by holding
unconstitutional the dismissal of veniremen based solely on their
opposition to capital punishment.38 This created “a broad standard
deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/history-of-the-death-penalty/earlyhistory-of-the-death-penalty [perma.cc/6ZPS-2P29].
31. Id.
32. ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (5TH ED.
2017).
33. A look at the history of capital punishment in the United States, VICT.
ADVOC. (Feb. 25, 2016), victoriaadvocate.com/counties/dewitt/history-of-capitalpunishment-in-the-united-states/article_02131991-103a-55ec-830be76ddd41aa5a.html.
34. Crimes Act, FED. JUD. CTR., fjc.gov/history/timeline/crimes-act-0
[perma.cc/8FX6-32Z3] (last visited Jan. 1, 2021).
35. Id. The seven death-eligible offenses were “treason, willful murder,
aiding in the escape of a death row felon, counterfeiting, piracy, and murder or
robbery on the high seas.” Adam Levinson, Crimes Act of 1790 (1st Federal
criminal
law),
STATUTES
&
STORIES
(Feb.
9,
2018),
statutesandstories.com/blog_html/crimes-act-of-1790-1st-federal-criminal-law/
[perma.cc/3BGJ-2YBG]. Hanging was specified as the sole method of execution
for these crimes. Id.
36. Crimes Act, supra note 34.
37. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27. For a thorough summary of the
constitutional law governing death qualification of the capital jury, see Sam
Kamin & Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Death Qualification and True Bifurcation:
Building on the Massachusetts Governor’s Council’s Work, 80 IND. L.J. 131
(2005).
38 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Court explained that,
“a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or
recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because
they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious
or religious scruples against its infliction.” Id. at 522. It was thus only
appropriate to exclude for cause jurors who “would automatically vote against
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applicable to the qualification of jurors in all death penalty states:
all that could constitutionally be required of jurors was a
willingness ‘to consider all the penalties provided by state law.’”39
Then, in 1972, Furman v. Georgia placed the initial ban on both
federal and state death penalty laws.40 In invalidating the death
penalty as it existed at both levels, the Court reasoned that such
regulations “resulted in a disproportionate application of the death
penalty, specifically discriminating against the poor and
minorities,” which ultimately violated the Eighth Amendment’s
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.41
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
clarified that capital punishment was not per se invalid as it
reinstated the death penalty at the state level.42 The Court reasoned
that criminal sanctions “must accord with ‘the dignity of man,’
which is the ‘basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.’”43
Therefore, states could still constitutionally impose the death
penalty where it did “not involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain,”44 and was not “grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.”45 In response to Furman, rather than
abolishing their unconstitutional death penalty laws, however,
thirty-five state legislatures developed new, constitutionally
the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might
be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward
the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to
the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 522 n.21 (emphasis in original).
39. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37, at 134 (citing Witherspoon, 391 U.S.
510 (emphasis in original)).
40. CORNELL L. SCH., Death Penalty, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
law.cornell.edu/wex/death_penalty [perma.cc/7QXZ-X2YJ] (last visited Jan. 25,
2021). Furman involved three Black prisoner-petitioners, all of whom has been
convicted in state court and sentenced to death by a jury under applicable state
statutes. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court held that the
racially discriminatory imposition of the death penalty “constitute[s] cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”
Id. at 239–40.
41. CORNELL L. SCH., supra note 40 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238).
42. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (“We now hold that the
punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.”). The Court
underscored that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment is not “a static concept.” Id. at 172–73. Rather, the Eighth
Amendment’s meaning must be drawn “from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)). Consequently, the Furman holding is better categorized as a suspension
of capital punishment, rather than its abolition.
43. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
44. Id. (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 392–93).
45. Id. (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100). Georgia revised its death penalty
procedures that were struck down by Furman and the Gregg Court approved
the modifications, “reasoning that the Georgia rules reduced the problem of
arbitrary application as seen in earlier statutes.” CORNELL L. SCH., supra note
40 (summarizing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
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permissible statutes that provided capital punishment “for at least
some crimes that result[ed] in the death of another person.”46
The United States did not reinstate the federal death penalty
until 1988, however, with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.47
Even still, it only applied to “a very narrow class of offenses.”48 By
the mid-1990s, the Crime Act of 1994 and the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 expanded the availability of the
federal death penalty to more than sixty substantive crimes.49
Today, federal law divides death-eligible crimes into three
categories: homicide offenses, espionage and treason, and “drug
offenses that do not involve a killing.”50 These categories now
specify approximately forty-two federal offenses that are eligible for
the death penalty,51 including genocide,52 murder for hire,53 and

46. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–80. Post-Gregg, the Supreme Court took up many
death penalty-related issues, and will undoubtedly do so again. See CORNELL L.
SCH., supra note 40 (providing a detailed timeline of death penalty
jurisprudence).
47. Catherine Kim, The Trump administration is bringing back federal
executions, VOX (July 25, 2019), vox.com/2019/7/25/8930191/federal-executiondeath-penalty-bill-barr-trump-administration [perma.cc/BV5B-WCKF]. See
Expansion of the Federal Death Penalty, CAP. PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT,
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/issues/expansion
[perma.cc/ULM4-AN2X]
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (explaining that, post-Furman, “whether there
should be a federal death penalty remained a controversial issue, and Congress
did not pass a capital punishment statute until 1988.” (referencing Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
48. Federal Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2017),
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/federal-death-penalty
[perma.cc/269K-UFST]. Most notably, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
colloquially known as the “Drug King Pin” statute, “authorize[d] the death
penalty for a defendant convicted in federal court of a murder committed while
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise.” Expansion of the Federal Death
Penalty, supra note 47.
49. Eileen M. Connor, The Undermining Influence of the Federal Death
Penalty on Capital Policymaking and Criminal Justice Administration in the
States, J. 100 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 149, 155–56 (2010) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 19882000 at 1 (2000) (available at usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html)
[perma.cc/2YFJ-VAJL]). The Federal Death Penalty Act was part of the Crime
Act of 1994, which authorized the death penalty for crimes including “murder
of designated government officials, kidnapping resulting in death, murder for
hire, fatal drive-by shootings, sexual abuse crimes resulting in death, carjacking resulting in death,” as well as “certain crimes not resulting in death.”
Expansion of the Federal Death Penalty, supra note 47.
50. Charles Doyle, Cong. Res. Serv., Federal Capital Offenses: An Overview
of Substantive and Procedural Law, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. R42095, at 13
(2016); 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2021).
51. Federal Laws Providing for the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR. (Jan. 1, 2019), deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/federal-laws-providing-deathpenalty [perma.cc/R3NX-3WHB].
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2021).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2021).
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Brendt Christensen’s crime of murder during a kidnapping.54
As of February 2021, capital punishment is authorized by the
federal government, twenty-seven states, and the U.S. military.55
Naturally, this means that twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia have abolished the death penalty, some of which simply
never attempted to pass revised legislation after Gregg.56 General
public support of capital punishment has remained steady over the
past few years, but “new death sentences and executions remain at
near historic lows.”57 From 2010 to 2015, just sixteen counties across
America sentenced “more than one person to death” on average each
year;58 these shifts are largely attributable to concerns about the
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2021).
55. States and Capital Punishment, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
(Mar. 24, 2020), ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penalty
[perma.cc/3TYS-44XR]. Currently, the following states permit capital
punishment: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. Of
those states, however, California, Oregon, and Pennsylvania each have a
gubernatorial moratorium on the death penalty, meaning that their governors’
offices have chosen to suspend the punishment. States Without the Death
Penalty,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.
(updated
March
2020),
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state
[perma.cc/6EKV6GN9]. In March 2021, Virginia became the first Southern state to abolish the
death penalty. Madeleine Carlisle, Why It’s So Significant Virginia Just
Abolished the Death Penalty, TIME (Mar. 24, 2021), time.com/5937804/virginiadeath-penalty-abolished/ [perma.cc/E5ZB-JCKB].
56. States Without the Death Penalty, supra note 55. The following twentytwo states and the District of Columbia have abolished the death penalty:
Alaska (1957), Colorado (2020), Connecticut (2012), Delaware (2016), District of
Columbia (1981), Hawaii (1957), Illinois (2011), Iowa (1965), Maine (1887),
Maryland (2013), Massachusetts (1984), Michigan (1847), Minnesota (1911),
New Hampshire (2019), New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), New York
(2007), North Dakota (1973), Rhode Island (1984), Vermont (1972), Washington
(2018), West Virginia (1965), and Wisconsin (1853). Id. California, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania each imposed a gubernatorial moratorium on the death penalty
in 2019, 2011, and 2015, respectively. Id.; Hadar Aviram, Death Penalty
Moratorium in California—What it Means for the State and for the Nation,
CONVERSATION
(Mar.
20,
2019),
theconversation.com/death-penaltymoratorium-in-california-what-it-means-for-the-state-and-for-the-nation113634 [perma.cc/M5NB-D2BR]. See New York, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/new-york
[perma.cc/Z9GD-W2EU] (last visited Feb. 17, 2021) (providing explanation
regarding New York’s 1984 “effective[]” abolition and its 2007 final abolition).
57. Amber Widgery, Death Penalty on Trial, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(June 7, 2019), www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-penaltyon-trial.aspx [perma.cc/8H8X-H63M].
58. BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH
PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 12 (2017). The sixteen counties
included “Los Angeles County, California, which leads the country in death
sentences,” and “Caddo Parish, in northwest Louisiana, where the prosecutor
emphatically says they should ‘kill more people.’” Id. Garrett poses a
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morality, efficiency, cost, and fairness “of this final form of
punishment.”59
The Colorado Method may have played a role in the decline of
capital punishment as well, with Colorado sentencing only two
people to death in the past decade.60 But after a seventeen-year
hiatus, the Trump administration resumed federal executions in
2020,61 and, for the first time in U.S. history, the federal
government subsequently “executed more American civilians than
all the states combined.”62 Despite this, sixty percent of Americans
believe that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is a
“better punishment for murder” than the death penalty.63 As of
spectacular question: “Should a handful of counties keep an entire state’s
execution machinery going?” Id.
59. Widgery, supra note 57.
60. Jeffrey Toobin, The Mitigator, NEW YORKER (May 9, 2011),
newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/09/the-mitigator
[perma.cc/LTC5-GT9G].
See GARRETT, supra note 58, at 59 (noting that “[t]he Colorado Method may be
part of the reason why” “there have been only two death sentences in Colorado
in the past decade.”). The Method “works because it conveys why each juror
must be capable of making an individual moral decision.” Id.
61. Madeleine Carlisle, In a Year Marked by Death, the Trump
Administration Cements a Legacy of Unprecedented Executions, TIME (Dec. 30,
2020),
time.com/5923973/trump-executions-death-penalty-covid-19/
[perma.cc/MKL2-TEHZ]. Daniel Lee was the first person executed by the
federal government “in more than 17 years.” Josh Gerstein, Trump
administration carries out first federal execution in 17 years, POLITICO (July 14,
2020),
politico.com/news/2020/07/14/supreme-court-federal-executioninjunction-360490 [perma.cc/XJ3C-U7KY]. When “asked if he wished to offer
any final words, he proclaimed his innocence.” Id.
62. Ed Pilkington, Trump administration has executed more Americans than
all states combined, report finds, GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2020),
theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/15/trump-administration-us-deathpenalty-executions [perma.cc/E63T-DMJV]. In 2020, the collective states
executed seven people; the Trump administration executed ten. Id. Daniel
Lewis Lee was executed on July 14, 2020; Wesley Ira Purkey was executed on
July 16, 2020; Dustin Lee Honken was executed on July 17, 2020; Lezmond
Charles Mitchell was executed on August 26, 2020; Keith Dwayne Nelson was
executed on August 28, 2020; William Emmett Lecroy, Jr. was executed on
September 22, 2020; Christopher Andre Vialva was executed on September 24,
2020; Orlando Cordia Hall was executed on November 19, 2020; Brandon
Bernard was executed on December 10, 2020; and Alfred Bourgeois was
executed on December 11, 2020. Capital Punishment, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
www.bop.gov/about/history/federal_executions.jsp
[perma.cc/39RC-W6M8]
(last visited Dec. 31, 2020). Three additional executions were quickly scheduled
before President Biden’s inauguration in January 2021, which were carried out
on January 13 (Lisa M. Montgomery), 14 (Cory Johnson), and 16 (Dustin John
Higgs). Id.
63. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Support for Death Penalty Holds Above Majority
Level, GALLUP (Nov. 19, 2020), news.gallup.com/poll/325568/support-deathpenalty-holds-above-majority-level.aspx [perma.cc/J59L-SE8M]. Accordingly,
the federal government’s decision to resume executions is “out of step with a
years-long decline in use of capital punishment at the state level, the suspension
of state executions this summer due to COVID-19 and rising opposition to the
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November 25, 2020, federal death row was home to fifty-four
individuals.64 At the state level, more than 2,500 inmates await the
same fate.65
1. Federal Death Penalty Procedures66
Capital punishment “cannot be sought without the prior
written authorization of the Attorney General.”67 The procedures
for gaining such authorization are set out in the United States
Attorneys’ Manual.68 Initially, U.S. Attorneys must submit an
authorization request for a case involving a death-eligible crime,
“regardless of whether or not the U.S. Attorney recommends
seeking the death penalty.”69 These submissions are sent to the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Criminal Division before being
passed on to a Capital Review Committee responsible for reviewing
all federal death-eligible cases.70 The Committee then has the
discretion to consider any reasons not to seek death that are raised
by the defense attorneys before making recommendations to the
Attorney General regarding whether seeking capital punishment
would be appropriate in that situation.71 Ultimately, the decision to
seek the death penalty in any particular case rests solely with the
U.S. Attorney General.72 The subsequent decision-making process
remains entirely confidential, but the local U.S. Attorneys must
wait for authorization before announcing their intent to seek the

death penalty among the American public.” Carlisle, supra note 61.
64. Christina Carrega, DOJ set to execute 5 federal prisoners before
Inauguration Day, CNN (Nov. 25, 2020), cnn.com/2020/11/25/politics/barrtrump-federal-executions/index.html [perma.cc/N5D4-53DJ]. Of the fifty-four
people on federal death row, twenty-four were Black men, twenty-one were
white men, seven were Latinos, one was an Asian woman, and one was a white
woman. Id. See List of Federal Death-Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/federal-death-penalty/list-offederal-death-row-prisoners [perma.cc/KTN4-DYDM] (last visited Dec. 31,
2020) (providing list of federal death row prisoners).
65. Death Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2020),
deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row/overview [perma.cc/3GFL-K43N].
66. Because each state’s death penalty is determined by its legislation, this
Comment focuses mainly on the federal death penalty for brevity’s sake.
67. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary
Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review, CAP. CASE REV.
PROCEDURE
(June
6,
2001),
justice.gov/archive/
dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm#capitalcasereviewprocedure
[perma.cc/Q3LW-M2PV].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Czajka, supra note 24.
72. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 9-10.000 – Capital Crimes, JUST. MANUAL (April
2014)
(available
at
justice.gov/jm/jm-9-10000-capital-crimes#9-10.010
[perma.cc/LK5K-H4E2]).
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death penalty.73 With support from Yingying Zhang’s family,74
prosecutors in Brendt Christensen’s case first announced their
intent to seek the death penalty on January 19, 2018.75
When the time comes to try a capital case, federal law requires
a bifurcated (two-part) trial comprised of a guilt phase and a
penalty phase.76 The bifurcation requirement initially serves as a
procedural safeguard to “counteract arbitrariness.”77 Moreover,
bifurcation was designed to shield the jury’s determination of a
capital defendant’s guilt from “the infiltration of potentially
prejudicial information, such as bad-character evidence and prior
convictions, that is admissible only during the second phase of
sentencing.”78 Importantly, though the severed phases of a capital
trial are “separate universes, governed by very different rules,”79
they are married by the requirement of a unitary jury.80
73. Indictment at 1, United States v. Christensen, No. 17-20037 (C.D. Ill.
July 12, 2017); Overview of the Capital Trial Process, CAP. PUNISHMENT IN
CONTEXT,
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/trialprocess
[perma.cc/XG3Z-WHW9] (last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
74. Lily Kuo, Yingying Zhang Murder: anger in China as US killer of scholar
spared death penalty, GUARDIAN (July 18, 2019), theguardian.com/usnews/2019/jul/19/yingying-zhang-killing-us-man-jailed-for-life-for-and-ofchinese-scholar [perma.cc/3LQX-PA36].
75. U.S. ATT’Y OFF. OF THE CENT. DIST. ILL., Government Files Intent to Seek
Death Penalty Against Champaign Man Charged with Kidnapping, Death of
Chinese Scholar, DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 19, 2018), justice.gov/usaocdil/pr/government-files-intent-seek-death-penalty-against-champaign-mancharged-kidnapping [perma.cc/HSN7-MY42].
76. James R. Spencer, Robin J. Cauthron, & Nancy G. Edmunds, Subcomm.
on Fed. Death Penalty Cases, Federal Death Penalty Cases: Recommendations
Concerning the Cost and Quality of Defense Representation (May 1998)
(available
at
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/original_spencer_report.pdf
[perma.cc/UAC4-TJ6F]). See Gregg v. Georiga, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976)
(positing that “the concerns expressed in Furman … are best met by a system
that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is
apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided
with standards to guide its use of the information”).
77. Jessie Cheng, Frontloading Mitigation: The “Legal” and the “Human” in
Death Penalty Defense, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 43 (2010). In 1972, the
Supreme Court had determined that “capital jurors, under the statutory
schemes that then existed, enjoyed an impermissible level of discretion in
administering death sentences,” thus resulting in unfettered arbitrariness. Id.
at 42 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). To combat this
arbitrariness, bifurcation “requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a
constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.” Wood v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
78. Talia Fisher, Constitutionalism and the Criminal Law: Rethinking
Criminal Trial Bifurcation, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 811, 813 (2011).
79. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at
Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1968 (Nov. 2005).
80. Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and
the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 793 (2006) [hereinafter
Rozelle I] (citing Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(1) (2000)
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The guilt phase requires the jury to determine “whether the
prosecution has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant has committed a crime punishable by death.”81 If, and
only if, a conviction is returned on the capital count, the trial then
moves on to the penalty phase, where the same jury decides
whether the defendant will be put to death.82 In the penalty phase,
the jury is presented with new evidence of aggravating and
mitigating factors.83 A convicted capital defendant may only receive
a death sentence if the jury concludes that (1) at least one of the
sixteen statutory aggravating circumstances listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3592(c) exists, and (2) the defendant either:
(A) killed the victim intentionally; (B) intentionally inflicted serious
injuries that resulted in the victim’s death; (C) intentionally
participated in an act, aware that it would expose a victim to lifethreatening force, and the victim died as a consequence; or (D)
intentionally engaged in an act of violence with reckless disregard
of its life-threatening nature and the victim died as a consequence.84

Aggravating factors are those threshold and additional
circumstances which make the defendant especially deserving of
death.85 Conversely, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b) prescribes seven
mitigating factors—those solely additional considerations which
make a life sentence more appropriate for that particular
defendant.86 To render a verdict of death, the jury must
unanimously agree that any aggravating factor(s) sufficiently
outweigh(s) any mitigating factor(s).87 This overwhelming duty of
deciding whether a stranger lives or dies is further complicated by
the unrealistic expectation that jurors think like legal experts in a
field most likely foreign to them.88
(providing that sentencing “shall be conducted . . . before the jury that
determined the defendant’s guilt”)).
81. SPENCER, CAUTHRON, & EDMUNDS, supra note 76; see also Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that juries, not judges, are responsible for
making the factual decisions as to whether a convicted murderer should receive
the death penalty).
82. Douglass, supra note 79, at 1969.
83. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 n.25 (1983) (affirming that the
death penalty may not be imposed unless “at least one . . . statutory aggravating
circumstances exist”).
84. DOYLE, supra note 50, at 13–14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)).
85. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (explaining that sentencing
authorities must be able to consider every possible mitigating factor, and should
not be limited to a specific list); Douglass, supra note 79, at 1994. For a list of
aggravating factors for homicide, see 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2021).
86. SPENCER, CAUTHRON, & EDMUNDS, supra note 76. For a list of
mitigating factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (2021).
87. U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 67.
88. J. Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the
Categorical Exemption of Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U.
RICH. L. REV. 961, 1001 (Mar. 2011).
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B. Capital Jury Selection
News of Brendt Christensen’s verdict understandably
prompted widespread anger across Yingying Zhang’s home country
of China.89 Zhang’s partner, Hou Xiaolin, was among the masses
who found the jury’s decision incomprehensible.90 Among other
commentary, a common theme emerged from the backlash that the
verdict was “proof the American justice system is not fair.”91
However, this result may be better categorized as proof that capital
jury selection is truly the gateway to success.92 Because a
defendant’s fate is so often “fixed after jury selection,” it is
unsurprising that jury selection is recognized as “the most
important part of any criminal trial.”93 The jury is heralded as “the
zenith of American jurisprudence: the marquee of justice designed
to protect the innocent and lay blame to the guilty.”94 Consequently,
the ability of a defense attorney to comprise a jury most favorable
to a capital defendant “is of paramount importance.”95
The severity of a capital trial inevitably transforms an
otherwise ordinary case into a complex and emotional event,
fraught with intense social pressure and anxiety.96 One of the
strengths of the American justice system97 “is the gravity with
which jurors view their charge to reach a decision based on the
information presented; however, this is also one of the most difficult
parts of being a juror.”98 Capital jurors “are only human,” yet they
are asked to participate in “an arduous, harrowing, life-changing
process.”99 Often, the theater that is a capital trial “leave[s] jurors
89. Kuo, supra note 74.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. JAMES A. DAVIS, MODIFIED WYMORE FOR NON-CAPITAL CASES, 1 (2017)
(available at davislawfirmnc.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/231/2017/01/NEWPAPER.pdf [perma.cc/M36F-C25V]).
93. Herald P. Fahringer, In the Valley of the Blind: A Primer on Jury
Selection in a Criminal Case, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 116, 116 (Autumn
1980).
94. Margaret Bull Kovera, Jason J. Dickinson, & Brian L. Cutler, Voir Dire
and Jury Selection, 2 HANDBOOK PSYCHOL. 161, 161 (2012).
95. Fahringer, supra note 93.
96. Courtney Mullin, The Jury System in Death Penalty Cases: A Symbolic
Gesture, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 140 (Autumn 1980).
97. In America, the justice system and the legal system are not the same
beast. Lynne Butler, Legal System vs. Justice System, MENSA CAN. (Apr. 24,
2019),
mensacanada.org/blog/2019/04/24/legal-system-vs-justice-system/
[perma.cc/AER9-23QP].
98. Janvier Slick, The weight of ‘playing God’: In capital punishment cases,
jurors
are
punished,
O R.
LIVE
(Jan.
10,
2019),
oregonlive.com/opinion/2011/10/the_weight_of_playing_god_in_c.html
[perma.cc/SV6G-JVF4].
99. ROBIN E. WOSJE, WILLIAM J. BRUNSON, & DAPHNE A. BURNS, PRESIDING
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with emotional scars and resentment.”100 In fact, the heightened
stress and anxiety of serving on a capital jury may lead to “extreme
emotional setbacks” and “a variety of health problems” for jurors,
including insomnia, nightmares, “stomach pains, nervousness,
tension, shaking, headaches, heart palpitations, sexual inhibitions,
depression, anorexia, faintness, numbness, chest pain, and
hives.”101 Accordingly, as columnist Janvier Slick argues, the
“unrecognized victims of the death penalty” are those jurors who are
forced to play God.102
Unlike any other kind of trial, death-eligible cases are
controlled by prejudice and emotionality,103 and any prejudices or
biases held by a juror have the potential to adversely “influence
final jury verdicts.”104 Accordingly, “death penalty voir dire is the
only time jurors’ sentiments about punishment play a central role
in determining their competence” to serve.105 In 1985, the Supreme
Court provided three acceptable inquiries concerning a potential
juror’s death penalty views, known as the Witt Questions: whether
the juror is so against the death penalty that they would
automatically vote for a life sentence; whether the juror is so in
favor of the death penalty that they would automatically vote for a
death sentence; and whether the juror is open to considering both
available sentences of the death penalty and life imprisonment
OVER A CAPITAL CASE: A BENCHBOOK FOR JUDGES 120–21 (2010); George Allen
Moore, The Righteous Cause of Justice and the American Trial Lawyer, ALA.
JUST. CTR., www.alabamajusticecenter.com/articles-legal-resources/righteouscause-justice-american-trial-lawyer/ [perma.cc/XY42-UJSK] (last visited Jan. 3,
2021) (stating that jurors are “empowered to make bi[n]ding decisions that
affect the lives and fortunes of their fellow citizens.”). See Slick, supra note 98
(“Jurors recognize that their verdict and sentencing decision affects not only the
defendant, but also the victim and his or her family members.”).
100. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., BLIND JUSTICE:
JURIES DECIDING LIFE AND DEATH WITH ONLY HALF THE TRUTH, at 24 (Oct.
2005) (available at prisonpolicy.org/scans/deathpenaltyinfo/blindjustice
report.pdf [perma.cc/D7YT-HRP9]).
101. Michael E. Antonio, Jurors’ Emotional Reactions to Serving on a
Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 282, 283 (2006) (citing S.M. Kaplan & C. Winget,
The Occupational Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
325, 327 (1992)).
102. Slick, supra note 98. Since 1999, Janvier Slick has debriefed jurors
after traumatic trials, including cases in which the death penalty was sought.
Id. He explains that jurors “are unconsidered casualties in death penalty cases,”
and recalls one remarkable juror who claimed, “that while she was convinced of
the defendant’s guilt, she was haunted by thoughts of the defendant’s
execution.” Id.
103. Mullin, supra note 96.
104. Ronald J. Matlon, Strategies for More Effective Voir Dire, THE JURY
EXPERT (Aug. 1, 2013), thejuryexpert.com/2013/08/strategies-for-moreeffective-voir-dire/ [perma.cc/869X-987B].
105. Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime
Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 32
(June 1984).
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without parole.106 Seven years later, in Morgan v. Illinois, the Court
clarified that: (1) a jury undertaking a capital sentencing must, for
due process purposes, be indifferent and impartial; (2) a potential
juror who would automatically vote to impose a death sentence may
be challenged for cause; (3) as part of the defendant’s right to an
impartial jury, the court must, at the defendant’s request, inquire
during voir dire into potential jurors’ beliefs regarding the death
penalty; (4) general questions as to whether the potential juror
could follow the law failed to adequately detect automatic-death
jurors; and (5) jurors who would automatically vote to impose or
automatically vote against the death penalty require
disqualification for their inability to follow the law.107
Research has shown that an individual’s attitude regarding the
death penalty is influenced by almost every part of their worldview:
socioeconomic status, age, geographical location, race, gender, and
religion108 – even personality traits, such as extroversion or
agreeableness, play a role.109 Thus, capital jury selection must be
careful, strategic, and thorough.110 As former Colorado Public
Defender Doug Wilson explains, “I’ve never had a capital client who
wasn’t severely damaged in some way,” and it is his responsibility,
not to justify their actions, but to “explain how they got there.”111
Capital jury selection involves two steps: general voir dire
questioning and death qualification.112
1. General Voir Dire
The Supreme Court has long held that a defendant must be
afforded the opportunity to, in the presence of the court, examine
and inspect each potential juror face to face.113 This preliminary

106. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
107. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992); see Reid v. State, 588 S.W.3d
725, 735 (Ark. 2019) (Linker Hart, J., dissenting) (summarizing Morgan’s fivepoint holding).
108. Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, & Martin T. Wells, The Deadly
Paradox of Capital Jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 371, 387 (2001).
109. John H. Blume, An Overview of Significant Findings From the Capital
Jury Project & Other Empirical Studies of the Death Penalty Relevant to Jury
Selection, Presentation of Evidence & Jury Instructions in Capital Cases 14–15
(2008), www.swlaw.edu/sites/default/files/2021-02/Williams%2C%20Kenneth
%20-%20Empirical%20Studies%20Summaries.pdf
[perma.cc/2XJR-5C9C]
(citing Monica Robbers, Tough-Mindedness and Fair Play: Personality Traits as
Predictors of Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty – an Exploratory Gendered
Study, 8 Punishment & Soc. 203 (2006)).
110. Jesse Nason, Mandatory Voir Dire Questions in Capital Cases: A
Potential Solution to the Biases of Death Qualification, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 211, 211 (2004).
111. Greene, supra note 6.
112. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 87.
113. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1894) (asserting that a
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examination is the voir dire: “the questioning of prospective jurors
in relation to their ability to decide a particular case.”114 Whereas
jury selection generally refers to “a pretrial legal proceeding,” voir
dire specifically refers to “the execution of that procedure.”115 Voir
dire functions “as a tool for counsel and the court to carefully and
skillfully determine, by inquiry, whether biases or prejudices, latent
as well as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial if a
particular juror serves on it.”116
One consequence of the bifurcation of capital trials is that the
voir dire questioning must necessarily be altered from that of other
criminal cases.117 Voir dire in capital cases should thereby
thoroughly probe the prospective jurors’ sincerely-held beliefs “to
ascertain whether they hold biases” which would prevent them from
impartially and fairly deciding the case at hand.118 In most cases,
this is “is a stark little exercise consuming minutes rather than
hours.”119 A “quick and cursory” voir dire not only respects the
potential jurors’ time, but preserves the court’s resources.120 In
capital cases, however, the process—rightfully—warrants “a timeconsuming” undertaking.121
The presiding judge typically conducts general voir dire by
asking prospective jurors questions “designed to elicit basic
demographic information, knowledge about the case, and perhaps
case-specific attitudes.”122 The most important function of this
process is to “eliminate extremes of partiality and assure . . . that

defendant “cannot be compelled to make a peremptory challenge until he has
been brought face to face, in the presence of the court, with each proposed juror,
and an opportunity given for such inspection and examination of him as is
required for the due administration of justice”).
114. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”,
27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 545 (1974).
115. Kovera, Dickson, & Cutler, supra note 94, at 165.
116. Ann M. Roan, Reclaiming Voir Dire, CHAMPION (July 2013),
www.nhd.uscourts.gov/pdf/FPI/Reclaiming%20Voir%20Dire.pdf
[perma.cc/NWP8-HJU4].
117. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 105.
118. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 94 (citing Smith v. State,
513 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). “Asking about bias against parts
of the range of punishment is certainly permissible,” especially because “bias
against any of the law upon which the defendant is to rely is ground for a
challenge for cause and a proper matter for query.” Smith, 513 S.W.2d at 826.
119. Babcock, supra note 114, at 549.
120. Nancy S. Marder, Juror Bias, Voir Dire, and the Judge-Jury
Relationship, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 927, 931 (June 23, 2015).
121. Paula Mitchell, Are Trial Courts Even-Handed in Excusing Jurors
Based on their Views on the Death Penalty?, VERDICT (Oct. 9, 2013),
verdict.justia.com/2013/10/09/trial-courts-even-handed-excusing-jurors-basedviews-death-penalty [perma.cc/8QB7-S98C]. The process of confirming that
potential jurors “will be able to set aside any personal convictions and follow the
law in the case before them” can consume several days to several weeks. Id.
122. Kovera, Dickson, & Cutler, supra note 94, at 162.
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the persons chosen to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused
will reach that decision solely upon the evidence produced at
trial.”123 Voir dire must also ask about pre-trial publicity and racial
attitudes.124 Frequently, capital voir dire “is conducted with the
entire group in the courtroom responding to questions by raising
their hands,” although sequestered and individual voir dire
“provides the best forum for determining people’s deeply-held
attitudes.”125 If the specific line of questioning warrants a sensitive
and private discussion, the judge may choose to inquire further in
chambers.126
2. Death Qualification
Specific to death penalty trials, each potential juror must be
“death qualified.”127 Death qualification is a unique type of voir dire
questioning that aims to determine an individual’s “fitness for jury
service” based on their attitudes specifically regarding capital
punishment.128 This process includes confirming whether, if seated,
the potential juror “will be able to follow the law in deciding what
sentence to impose.”129
Some courts conduct death qualification “in a totally individual
session with one juror appearing in the courtroom at a time; others
123. State v. Honeycutt, 285 N.C. 174, 179 (N.C. 1974), death sentence
vacated, 428 U.S. 903 (1976) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965),
rehearing denied, 381 U.S. 921 (1965)).
124. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 115–16 (citing Mu’Min
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (pretrial publicity); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.
28 (1986) (racial bias)). The Supreme Court has “acknowledged that ‘adverse
pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community
that jurors’ claims that they can be impartial should not be believed.’” Mu’Min,
500 U.S. at 429 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)).
Additionally, “a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to
have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the
issue of racial bias.” Turner, 476 U.S. at 36–37. Both issues of pretrial publicity
and racial bias were inquired into during the Christensen voir dire since the
case had already received international attention and because Zhang was a
Chinese non-citizen. S.E. Honeyman, Christensen Trial Notebook 3 (June 2019)
(on file with author).
125. Mullin, supra note 96, at 146.
126. Marder, supra note 120, at 932.
127. Mark Costanzo & Lawrence T. White, An Overview of the Death Penalty
and Capital Trials: History, Current Status, Legal Procedures, and Cost, 50 J.
SOC. ISSUES 1, 7 (July 1994). See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 913 (2015)
(explaining death qualification by stating, “no one can serve on a capital jury
who is not willing to impose the death penalty.”) (citing Rozelle I, supra note 80,
at 772–93, 807).
128. Craig Haney, Aida Hurtado, & Luis Vega, “Modern” Death
Qualification, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 619, 619 (1994).
129.
Death
Qualification,
CAP.
PUNISHMENT
IN
CONTEXT,
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/deathqualification [perma.cc/L2QKKSQU] (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
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administer it in small groups of five to eight jurors.”130 Regardless,
being death qualified means that each juror must be willing to give
meaningful consideration to both a death sentence and a sentence
of life imprisonment without parole.131 Any veniremen possessing
“disqualifying” attitudes are excused from service,132 and the end
result is, theoretically, “a jury pronounced fit to decide a capital
case.”133 Ideally, that fitness is based on individuals who “are not
strictly opposed to capital punishment but who also do not believe
that the death penalty should be imposed in all cases of capital
murder.”134
Considering how “jurors’ prior experiences and attitudes are
more likely to influence their verdict than the arguments presented
to them at trial,” successful death qualification is critically
important to any capital defendant.135 Without sufficient
information about the prospective jurors’ innate beliefs and biases,
a capital defendant “cannot realize his right to ‘select’ the jury”136
in his best interest.137 Consequently, the process relies heavily on
potential jurors being “honest and forthcoming in revealing some of
their most personally held attitudes, beliefs, and biases.”138
These jury selection processes continue until the deathqualified potential jury pool reaches its desired total, which is
typically set by the judge. For Brendt Christensen, that meant
seventy death-qualified veniremen.139 The judge and the attorneys
then select each citizen who will make up the jury, as well as any

130. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 87. For Christensen, the
preliminary questioning took place in open court via panel voir dire, but each
potential juror was additionally questioned alone in chambers with respect to
death qualification.
131. Death Qualification, supra note 129.
132. Haney, Hurtado, & Vega, supra note 128.
133. Alice Chao et al., Death-Qualified Juries and the Flowers Trials,
CORNELL U. L. SCH. SOC. SCI. & L., courses2.cit.cornell.edu/sociallaw/
FlowersCase/deathqualifiedjuries.html [perma.cc/Z6FN-2YBY] (last visited
Feb. 17, 2021).
134. Id.
135. Matlon, supra note 104 (citing RANDALL A. BONO, A FORMER JUDGE’S
PERSPECTIVE ON VOIR DIRE (2000)).
136. Babcock, supra note 114, at 549.
137. Absolute impartiality “is impossible for any juror,” and the “reasons a
jury may impose a death sentence are about as predictable as being ‘struck by
lightning.’” Dillard, supra note 88 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–
10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
138. Kovera, Dickson, & Cutler, supra note 94, at 163.
139. Ben Zigterman, 175 potential jurors for Christensen trial eliminated;
pool
now
at
476,
NEWS-GAZETTE
(May
14,
2019),
newsgazette.com/news/potential-jurors-for-christensen-trial-eliminated-pool-nowat/article_002c2ec3-6513-5d0e-b841-cd1f431217cf.html
[perma.cc/3UPCAXJ5]. It took seven days to select the seventy death-qualified veniremen in
Christensen. Honeyman, supra note 124, at 13.

268

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:1

alternate jurors, together.140 Undoubtedly, the success of seating a
favorable jury is inextricably intertwined with the effectiveness of
the death qualification.141
Frustratingly, few protections for a capital defendant are
meant to “expedite criminal proceedings, and the voir dire
necessary to safeguard a capital defendant’s right to a fair trial is
no exception.”142 Judges are consistently pressured to “curtail those
protections and thereby save the extra time they require.”143 Thus,
voir dire in federal courts often limits the attorneys’ abilities to fully
probe and uncover potential biases.144 An in-depth, probing voir dire
is clearly necessary in capital cases, but courts still “exert a
tremendous amount of pressure on attorneys to move their cases
along.”145 Nonetheless, “[g]iven the important, delicate, and
complex nature of the death qualification process, there can be no
substitute for thorough and searching inquiry.”146
3. Excluding Disqualified Jurors
There are two kinds of excusable jurors: nullifiers and
excludables.147 Nullifiers are those individuals who would simply
“refuse to convict of a death-eligible crime despite evidence” of the
defendant’s guilt.148 Nullification has been around “since trial by
jury was first established in thirteenth century England and still
exists today.”149 Alternatively, those jurors who are classified as
excludables would vote to convict a guilty capital defendant, but
would not consider voting for the death penalty as punishment.150
Seating either nullifiers or excludables on a capital jury “subverts
the system” and is precisely what the death qualification process
was created to avoid.151 If a juror is unfit to serve on a capital case,
they must be excused, though “the legal category of exclusion is not

140. How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASSOC. (Sept. 9, 2019),
americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_ne
twork/how_courts_work/juryselect/ [perma.cc/C8JZ-MP38]. In Christensen,
twelve jurors and six alternates were ultimately selected. Honeyman, supra
note 124, at 13.
141. Kovera, Dickson, & Cutler, supra note 94, at 163.
142. John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & A. Brian Threlkeld, Probing
“Life Qualification” Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209,
1239 (2001).
143. Id.
144. Matlon, supra note 104, at 1–2.
145. Mullin, supra note 96, at 151.
146. State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1182 (N.J. 1988).
147. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 775–77.
148. Id. at 776.
149. BOHM, supra note 32, at 2.
150. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 776.
151. Id. at 776–77.
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bounded by bright and unyielding lines.”152
“[J]ury selection, in a real sense, is an opportunity for counsel
to see if there is anything in a juror’s yesterday or today that would
make it difficult for that juror to view the facts, not in an abstract
sense, but in a particular case, dispassionately.”153 Subsequently,
both automatic life and automatic death jurors must be excluded.154
After each potential juror’s interviews, the attorneys and judge
privately scrutinize the responses received and attempt to
determine whether the individual should be excused or seated.155
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the 1968 Supreme Court held that
prospective jurors could not be disqualified from jury service simply
because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or
expressed conscientious or religious scruples against it.156 Twentyfour years later, in Morgan v. Illinois, the Court ruled that
automatic death penalty jurors must be excused “because their
presence on the jury would violate ‘the requirement of impartiality
embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.’”157 Conversely, “not all who oppose the death penalty
are subject to removal for cause in capital cases.”158 Rather, “those
who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may
nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state
clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own
beliefs in deference to the rule of law.”159
There are two ways to remove an individual from the jury pool:
they may be excused “for cause” or excused by a peremptory
strike.160 Initially, some jurors may be excused for cause if they
possess “work hardships, childcare problems, and other physical
health issues.”161 These excusals can easily be conducted in open
court before any discussion of the case commences, like in
Christensen.162 Then, if any remaining juror’s “feelings about the
152. Craig Haney, Examining Death Qualification: Further Analysis of the
Process Effect, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 133, 135 (1984) [hereinafter Haney I].
153. State v. Hedgepath, 66 N.C. App. 390, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
154. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 116.
155. Kovera, Dickson, & Cutler, supra note 94, at 162.
156. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519–20 (holding that the dismissal of
potential jurors based on their personal opposition to the death penalty was
unconstitutional because, “in a nation less than half of whose people believe in
the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for
the community”).
157. Blume, Johnson, & Threlkeld, supra note 142, at 1217 (citing Morgan
v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992)).
158. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
159. Id.
160. How Courts Work, supra note 140.
161. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 91.
162. Ben Zigterman, Court casting wide net for jury in Christensen trial,
NEWS-GAZETTE (Mar. 15, 2019), news-gazette.com/news/court-casting-widenet-for-jury-in-christensen-trial/article_28623a3b-46ca-50c1-95cb-
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death penalty [in either direction] would impair his or her ability to
judge the case and choose the punishment fairly,” they must also be
excused for cause.163 Ultimately, the judge has the final say in which
veniremen are dismissed,164 though most states allow both parties
to ask follow-up questions before that final call.165 The prosecution
and defense are both granted an unlimited number of times to
request a juror be excused “for cause.”166 For prosecutors, the idea
here is to strike jurors “who have doubts about the death penalty,”
whereas defense attorneys will aim to strike jurors “who are so prodeath penalty that they could not judge guilt fairly in a capital
case.”167
Any jurors who survive these initial challenges may still be
eliminated through peremptory challenges.168 Peremptory
challenges are used to dismiss jurors without having to state a
reason, although peremptory challenges based on a juror’s race,
gender, or religion are strictly prohibited.169 These excusals are
limited in number by jurisdiction and are not subject to the court’s
discretion.170 Thus, if either party perceives any prospective juror to
be biased, “that party may argue to the court that the person should
be struck for cause and, failing that, may strike him
peremptorily.”171 Ideally, at the end of this process, which can take
up to weeks at a time, the stage will be set for the capital trial to
begin.172 In the end, a capital jury should consist of “jurors who can
follow the law and consider the death penalty and any life options .

0cf16566ce1b.html [perma.cc/F446-FFGX?type=image] (reporting that as much
of the jury selection process would be done in open court as possible).
163. Death Qualification, supra note 129.
164. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985). The Court affirmed “that
the question whether a venireman is biased has traditionally been determined
through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the
venireman’s state of mind,” especially since “such a finding is based upon
determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial
judge’s province.” Id.
165. Haney I, supra note 152, at 134.
166. Babcock, supra note 114, at 550.
167. Death Qualification, supra note 129.
168. Id.
169. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, (1986) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from using
peremptory challenges to excuse potential jurors based on their race).
170 Death Qualification, supra note 129; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
220 (1965).
171. Babcock, supra note 114, at 551.
172. Richard Kopf, How long should it take to pick a jury in a murder case?,
HERCULES
&
UMPIRE
(June
23,
2013),
herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/06/23/how-long-should-it-take-to-pick-a-juryin-a-murder-case/ [perma.cc/HP9U-36U8]. For Brendt Christensen, he met
face-to-face with more than 100 potential jurors and, after about one week, faced
a jury of twelve of his peers with six alternates at the ready. Honeyman, supra
note 124, at 13.
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even though they may be personally in favor or against the death
penalty.”173
As the sparing of Christensen’s life suggested to many that “the
American justice system is not fair,”174 the result may be better
categorized as proof that capital jury selection is truly the lynchpin
to success—for both the prosecution and defense.175

C. The Colorado Method
Beginning in 1990, researchers from eight different states
teamed up with the National Science Foundation to create the
Capital Jury Project (“CJP”).176 A multidisciplinary research effort,
the CJP set out “to generate ‘a comprehensive and detailed
understanding of how capital jurors actually make their life or
death decisions.’”177 Its findings, however, were generally
disheartening: among other flaws, the CJP uncovered evidence of
“premature decision-making,” “bias in jury selection,” “failure to
comprehend instructions,” “erroneous beliefs that death is
required,” “evasion of responsibility for the punishment decision,”
“racial influence in juror decision making,” and “underestimation of
non-death penalty alternatives.”178 Further, the CJP found that
“capital jurors hold disproportionately punitive orientations toward
crime and criminal justice, are more likely to be conviction-prone,
are more likely to hold racial stereotypes, and are more likely to be
pro-prosecution.”179 In spite of these concerning revelations, the
CJP also revealed that “most juries start deliberations with at least
some jurors who support a life sentence.”180 Former Chief Deputy
173. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 116.
174. Id.; Kuo, supra note 74.
175. DAVIS, supra note 92.
176. Bowers, supra note 28, at 1043. The CJP conducted “three-to-four hour
interviews with 80 to 120 capital jurors in each of the participating states,” in
order to study “the extent to which jurors’ exercise of capital sentencing
discretion is still infected with, or now cured of, the arbitrariness which the
United States Supreme Court condemned in Furman v. Georgia.” Id.
177. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 784 (citing Bowers, supra note 28).
178. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 54. The disheartening nature of
death penalty jurisprudence runs deep—an understanding among defense
lawyers everywhere. See Greene, supra note 6 (detailing the story of Mary
Claire Mulligan, a death penalty defense lawyer from Boulder County,
Colorado, and quoting her as saying that she had lost “any belief that the system
was fair, or just, or would ultimately work.”).
179. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 785 (citing BENJAMIN FLEURY-STEINER,
JUROR’S STORIES OF DEATH: HOW AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY INVESTS IN
INEQUALITY 24–25 (2004)).
180. Eric R. Carpenter, An Overview of the Capital Jury Project for Military
Practitioners: Jury Dynamics, Juror Confusion, and Juror Responsibility, Army
Law. 6, 22 (2011) (citing Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs – Capital Jurors Who
Change Their Minds About the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing
Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1196–220 (1995)).
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for the Colorado Public Defender System, David Wymore,
understood this finding for what it really meant: defense counsel
must figure out a way to “preserve those potential votes.”181
In response to the CJP’s research, Wymore published an article
outlining a new litigation technique he called “the Colorado Method
of capital jury selection” in 1995.182 Centered around the unique
dynamics of each potential juror, Wymore’s technique provides
defense teams with a structured approach to capital voir dire “that
maximizes the opportunity to obtain life verdicts.”183 Broadly
speaking, the Colorado Method creates “a nonjudgmental respectful
atmosphere during jury selection that facilitates juror candor” with
the intent of uncovering potential jurors’ attitude toward the death
penalty and its imposition.184 Its premise is simple: every juror must
decide individually “whether to impose the death penalty or
exercise mercy.”185 This requires defense attorneys to “secure a jury
favorably disposed to the consideration of mitigating evidence.”186
The Colorado Method’s framing of a capital juror’s duty as a “deeply
personal judgment,” rather than a unanimous factual
181. Id. (citing Videotape: Selecting a Colorado Jury—One Vote for Life
(Wild Berry Productions 2004), available at thelifepenalty.com/). Interestingly,
Wymore was called to his specialty after watching the 1958 film noir “I Want to
Live!” Greene, supra note 6. Wymore was “crushed” when Susan Haywood’s
character, a prostitute wrongly convicted of murder, was given the death
penalty. Id. Wymore worked on approximately eighty death penalty cases
during his tenure; “None of Wymore’s clients ever was executed.” Christine
Reid, Masters’ attorney a master public defender, DAILY CAMERA (Aug. 16,
2009),
www.dailycamera.com/2009/08/16/masters-attorney-a-master-publicdefender/ [perma.cc/GKW2-426R]. Noting that Wymore “passed on his ‘dogged
determination’ to a ‘generation of public defenders,’” his colleagues have
affectionately dubbed him “the ‘epitome of no stone unturned.’” Garrett, supra
note 58, at 54 (citing Jessica Fender, Tenacity Led to His Toughest Win Ever,
DENVER POST (Jan. 21, 2008), www.denverpost.com/2008/01/20/tenacity-led-tohis-toughest-win-ever/).
182. John Ingold, Timeline: The death penalty in Colorado, COLO. SUN (Mar.
4, 2019), coloradosun.com/2019/03/04/timeline-the-death-penalty-in-colorado/
[perma.cc/SH6A-84WV]. This technique is also sometimes referred to as the
Morgan Method or the Wymore Method. See Webinar: Introduction to the
Methods and Techniques of the Colorado Method, NAT’L ASSOC. FOR PUB. DEF.
(Dec.
30,
1899),
publicdefenders.us/ev_calendar_day.asp?eventid=71
[perma.cc/P325-QYZ5] (referring to the technique as the Colorado Method and
Morgan Method interchangeably); see also Choosing Jurors Who Will Choose
Life: Capital Case Jury Selection, CTR. FOR DEATH PENALTY LITIG. (2016),
cdpl.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/October-24-26-2016-WymoreTraining.pdf [perma.cc/4S6J-643D] (referring to the Wymore Method).
183. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 18.
184. Id.
185. GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54. See Toobin, supra note 60 (explaining
that the Colorado Method “empower[s] the jurors to know their right to show
mercy.” (statement of David Lane, Colorado Method proponent)).
186. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A
New Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 1 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 141
(2010).
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determination, helps the defense prepare the jurors who remain “for
the possibility of a life verdict.”187
Wymore, who, admittedly, has “never been big” on “the whole
reaping lethal vengeance on the citizenry thing,”188 believed that
jury selection, especially for a capital trial, could only be improved
by attacking its flaws with science.189 Interestingly, that science
stems from a series of U.S. Navy-sponsored experiments.190 In the
1950s, social psychologist Solomon Asch uncovered “the dynamic of
social conformity, which is essentially the fear of disagreeing with
the majority in a public setting.”191 Asch discovered that, in group
settings, many individuals succumb to pressure to “go along with
the group” and modify their behavior accordingly.192 Individuals
then become “captive to this social conformity,” and have difficulty
cultivating their own ideas.193 Similar to the situation many capital
jurors face in the deliberation room, Asch explained the
circumstances of this social conformity:
The subject knows (1) that the issue is one of fact; (2) that a correct
result is possible; (3) that only one result is correct; (4) that the
others and he are oriented to and reporting about the same
objectively given relations; (5) that the group is in unanimous
opposition at certain points with him.194

However, this social conformity effect can be significantly
reduced when an individual believes “that his decision is a moral,
not necessarily factual” choice, and understands that being in
opposition to the majority is perfectly acceptable because more than
one resolution exists.195 This development was key to the
187. Broda-Bahm I, supra note 3.
188. Greene, supra note 6.
189. GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54 (“Wymore believed that there should be
more of a science to jury selection in death penalty cases.”).
190. Carpenter, supra note 180, at 7.
191. Id. (citing S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification
and Distortion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN: RESEARCH IN
HUMAN RELATIONS 177 (Harold Guetzkow ed. 1951); SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1952); Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity:
A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS:
GEN & APPLIED 1 (1956)). Asch himself described his investigations as being
“concerned with the conditions of independence and lack of independence in the
face of group pressure.” Id.
192. Id. at 8 (citing S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the
Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN:
RESEARCH IN HUMAN RELATIONS 181 (Harold Guetzkow ed. 1951)).
193. Saby Ghoshray, Capital Jury Decision Making: Looking Through the
Prism of Social Conformity and Seduction to Symmetry, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV.
477, 485 (2013).
194. Carpenter, supra note 180, at 22 (citing SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 461 (1952)).
195. Id. Interestingly, Asch’s conclusion may have unintentionally paved the
way for partisan distrust of science and evidence in favor of opinion and feelings
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establishment of the Colorado Method.196
The brass tacks explanation of the Colorado Method’s structure
provides two goals: (1) getting jurors to reveal their thoughts
regarding the death penalty and mitigation, so that the defense
team may “rationally exercise their peremptory challenges and []
build grounds for challenges for cause;” and (2) minimizing or,
preferably, eliminating the social conformity Asch identified.197
Today, even though jury selection has consistently been a “daunting
task” for capital defense lawyers,198 David Wymore and his
colleagues have been “credited with largely slowing down death
penalty sentencing in Colorado.”199 The more times prosecutors
sought the death penalty against Wymore’s defendants and lost, the
less Colorado prosecutors bothered to seek it.200 In fact, before
Colorado abolished the death penalty in March 2020, use of the
Colorado Method had “nearly emptied Colorado’s death row.”201 As
Wymore’s creation continues to gain notoriety across the country’s
state and federal jurisdictions,202 it has evolved into “the gold
standard in death penalty defense.”203 Better yet, “the Colorado
Method of jury selection has been proven to work.”204 Increasing
success in state and federal courts nationwide205 begs the question:
how’d Wymore do it?
To overcome a death sentence, the Colorado Method “seeks to
reduce the force of social conformity and get the life votes out of the
deliberation room.”206 Whereas other approaches to capital voir dire

seen throughout the 2020 political uprising and January 6, 2021 insurrection—
although such a discussion is well outside the scope of this Comment.
196. Id.
197. Id. (explaining “[t]his is a very simplified description of the method”).
198. Thomas J. Hurney, Jr. & Randal H. Sellers, Picking Juries:
Questionnaires and Beyond, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 370, 370 (Jan. 2008).
199. Stimson et al., supra note 20.
200. Id.
201. National Capital Voir Dire Training Program, NAT’L COLL. OF CAP.
VOIR DIRE, nccvd.org (last visited Jan. 5, 2020). Since reinstating the death
penalty in the 1970s, Colorado has only executed one person. Neil Vigdor,
Colorado Abolishes Death Penalty and Commutes Sentences of Death Row
Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/
colorado-death-penalty-repeal.html [perma.cc/3WDT-E38E].
202. Broda-Bahm I, supra note 3.
203. Ingold, supra note 182 (citing Capital Training, OFF. COLO. ST. PUB.
DEF., coloradodefenders.us/training/capital-training/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2021)).
204. Robert Costello, Three Important Books Worthy of Your Time, 32 Crim.
Just. 52, (2018) (quoting EDWARD C. MONAHAN & JAMES J. CLARK, TELL THE
CLIENT’S STORY: MITIGATION IN CRIMINAL AND DEATH PENALTY CASES 416
(2017)).
205. Id. (explaining “[f]or the past few decades, death penalty defense
lawyers have been successfully using the Colorado Method in state and federal
courts across the country.”).
206. Carpenter, supra note 180.
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have focused specifically on forming a “tribe” with jurors to do so,
the Colorado Method specifically “aims to uncover inner biases.”207
The technique does so by emphasizing how each member of a jury
must respect one another’s beliefs and, ultimately, their vote for life
or death.208 In a very real sense, however, the Colorado Method is
all about disqualification.209 Its structure can be broken down into
five stages:210 (1) the Preliminary Ranking stage; (2) the
Information-Gathering stage; (3) the Record-Building stage; (4) the
Trial Overview stage; and (5) the Principle Confirmation Stage.
1. The Preliminary Ranking Stage
Before voir dire begins at the district courthouse, the Colorado
Method encourages defense counsel to request a juror
questionnaire.211 If granted, the court summons local eligible
citizens to complete the questionnaire of questions agreed upon by
both parties.212 The responses are usually the attorneys’ primary
information about the jury pool,213 providing a brief insight into
each potential juror’s demographics, characteristics, and feelings
toward the death penalty.214 Strategic questionnaires will be
written in a way that elicit “more than a yes or no answer” in order
to “learn more about how potential jurors think, not just what they
think.”215 After receiving these responses, but before beginning the
voir dire process, the defense team ranks each respondent based on
the Colorado Method’s seven-point scale.216
A juror ranked as a “1” is a person who will never vote for the
death penalty; the Colorado Method dubs this person a “Witt
Excludable” juror.217 The person is “vocal, adamant, and articulate
207. Lepir, supra note 13, at 400.
208. Id. at 396–97.
209. Honeyman, supra note 124, at 14.
210. These stages are summarized based on the information provided in
Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 18–27.
211. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 21.
212. Jury Service, U.S. CTS., www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service
[perma.cc/H2ML-TXJF] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
213. Selecting a jury can be complicated during divisive political times,
supra note 11.
214. GORDON BERMANT, FED. JUD. CTR., JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 7–8 (June 1982) (available at
www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/JurSelPro.pdf [perma.cc/6H4N-S8EC]).
215. Selecting a jury can be complicated during divisive political times,
supra note 11 (emphasis added).
216. These categories are summarized from the information provided in
Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 21.
217. GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54; Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 18
(referencing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)). The Witt standard
“for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of
his or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the juror’s views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
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about” their disdain for capital punishment.218 A “1” juror “is
impaired because [he or] she will never give meaningful
consideration to a death sentence.”219
A juror ranked as a “2” is a person “who is hesitant to say that
he [or she] believes in the death penalty.”220 This person clearly
recognizes “the seriousness of being asked to sit on the capital jury
and takes seriously the value of human life.”221 Nonetheless, this
individual asserts that he or she “can give meaningful consideration
to the death penalty.”222 Category 2 jurors “can be intelligent
abstract thinkers or less intelligent, but compassionate, people.”223
Noted as “[b]asically pro-death penalty,” a juror ranked as a
“3” is a person who, while able to quickly assert they have favored
the death penalty for a long time, is “unable to express why.”224
Known as a “kill problem,” this person is seemingly pro-death
penalty “as long as someone else is responsible for imposing the
sentence.”225 Category 3 jurors are “sensitive to mitigation” and, if
asked to do so, could “make an argument against the death
penalty.”226 These jurors are also “readily willing to respect the
views and individual assessments of those who are more hesitant
about the death penalty.”227
A juror ranked as a “4” is a person who is comfortable and
secure in the utilization of capital punishment.228 Referred to as
“[p]ro-death,” this individual is able to explain why they are for the
death penalty, although they will readily listen to mitigating
factors; they want to hear “both sides.”229 Category 4 jurors “readily
argue that there could be mitigation that calls for life even after
conviction of first-degree, cold-blooded, after-deliberation
murder.”230 These veniremen differ from category 3 jurors “in their
initial response of having a comfort level with the death penalty.”231
A juror ranked as a “5” is also pro-death but goes further in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424.
218. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 18.
219. Id. at 19. A juror ranked as a “1” “will be excluded for cause by the
judge.” GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54.
220. Id. at 18.
221. Id.
222. Id. Essentially, whether the potential venireperson can give
“meaningful consideration” is the lynchpin of the Colorado Method.
223. Id. at 18–19.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. A juror ranked as a “2” or “3” “believes in the death penalty but does
not have strong reasons to be for it, and, depending on the person, can feel
compassion for a criminal.” GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54.
228. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 19.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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that they are vocal and “articulate in their support for the death
penalty.”232 This person is a “sure vote for death” but might also be
sensitive to perhaps two or three mitigating factors.233 Category 5
jurors typically react positively to the prosecutors, but they would
be less prone to bullying other jurors than a category 6 or 7 juror.234
A juror ranked as a “6” is “a strong pro-death juror.”235 This is
someone who, while a “[c]oncrete backer of the death penalty,”
escapes the automatic death penalty ranking because he or she can
perhaps listen to mitigating factors.236 A category 6 juror’s sole
“argument against the death penalty is that it is not used
enough.”237 These jurors usually nod their heads along with the
prosecutors and believe that “the economic burden of a life sentence
for defendant and others will personally affect [him or] her.”238
When faced with a 6 or 7 juror, defense counsel should begin to
prepare a cause challenge.239
Finally, a juror ranked as a “7” is a person who will absolutely
impose a death sentence for a defendant convicted of capital
murder.240 Referred to as an “ADP” (automatic death penalty), this
individual believes in “an eye for an eye,” and feels that life
imprisonment is not an adequate alternate sentence.241 Category 7
jurors are “[h]ateful and proud of it,” and believe the only mitigating
circumstances would entail self-defense or manslaughter.242 A “7”
juror “is impaired because [he or] she will not give meaningful
consideration to life imprisonment without release.”243 This person
resembles an automatic vote for death.244
To be sure, this aforementioned scale is confusing.245
Essentially, a ranking of “1” would convey “Gandhi,” and a ranking
of 7 “would be Hitler,” with rankings 2 through 6 marking all points
in between.246 The ranking assigned to each potential juror denotes
232. Id. A juror ranked as a “4” or “5” “comfortably support[s] the death
penalty” but is “open to hearing arguments that a particular murderer might
not deserve the ultimate punishment.” GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54.
233. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 19.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 21.
240. Id. at 19
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. A juror ranked as a “7” “will be excluded by the judge just like a”
juror ranked as a “1.” GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54.
245. See infra Part III(C)(1) (dissecting the problematic overlap between the
preliminary ranking stages).
246. Macradee Aegerter, Defense attorneys use ‘Colorado method’ to save
theater shooter from death penalty, FOX 31 DENVER (Aug. 10, 2015),
kdvr.com/news/defense-attorneys-use-colorado-method-to-save-theater-
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the ultimate goal of voir dire: “removal or retention” of each
juror.”247 The defense team will then use these rankings to set out
their game plan for the in-person voir dire with respect to each
individual.248 If the juror is ranked 4 to 7, defense counsel will
prepare a cause challenge; if the juror is ranked 1 to 4, defense
counsel will develop a defense against government cause
challenges.249 Now recognized as “the leading defense approach” to
voir dire, the Colorado Method utilizes this ranking to “secure a jury
favorably disposed to the consideration of mitigating evidence.”250
2. The Information-Gathering Stage
During the Information-Gathering Stage, defense attorneys
are primarily concerned with discerning each potential juror’s
ability to serve on a case that will, evidently, be gruesome and
violent in nature.251 Here, the Colorado Method encourages
attorneys to utilize a poster to summarize the charges in the
indictment, because presenting this information first may allow a
“small but not insignificant number of prospective jurors” to request
a hardship excusal.252 The Colorado Method asserts that, by
discussing “the violent nature of the charges” before asking about
capital punishment, defense attorneys are “more likely to get
emotionally honest” feedback, as well as “a more realistic
assessment of the jurors’ ability to give meaningful consideration to
all sentencing options.”253
The Information-Gathering stage directs defense counsel to
use a “conversational and nonjudgmental tone” when asking openended questions that will elicit the juror’s views about the death
penalty.254 The specific views defense counsel should attempt to
uncover include situations perceived to be deserving of the death
penalty, any “arguments or policy reasons the juror finds
compelling for or against capital punishment, the length of time the
juror has held these views, and the basis for these views.”255 This
involves exploring the individual’s “upbringing, religious
conviction, personal moral code, concerns about appropriate use of
government resources,” and more.256 In this stage, the Colorado
shooter-from-death-penalty/amp/ [perma.cc/X8M6-4C87] (statement of David
Lane, death penalty criminal defense attorney and Colorado Method lecturer).
247. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 22.
248. Id. at 21–22.
249. Id.
250. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 186.
251. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 20.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 21.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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Method seeks to prevent “shallow and meaningless, socially
acceptable responses” that are too frequently the result of typical
voir dire.257 As the Supreme Court has noted, “[w]ithout an
adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the
court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be
fulfilled.”258
Finally, the Colorado Method encourages the defense team to
collectively modify their rating from the Preliminary Ranking stage
“based upon the juror’s response to the court, government, and
defense questioning.”259 In reviewing how a juror’s ranking may
have changed, the defense team thus reassesses its voir dire plan
for that juror, and adjusts their next steps accordingly.260 This
construct has been well-received by the defense community: “[i]n
selecting a jury, the most effective strategy may be to consider each
prospective juror’s ‘Wymore ranking’ with little or no attention to
other possible predictors of his or her decision.”261
3. The Record-Building Stage
While the Information-Gathering stage utilizes open-ended
questions to get a sense of the potential juror as a person, the
Record-Building stage uses leading questions to forge a path to
impairment or protection.262 During this part of capital voir dire,
the defense attorneys compile a comprehensive record of all of the
juror’s responses thus far in order to “support a ‘cause’ challenge
against pro-death jurors and to defend against a government ‘cause’
challenge against potential life-givers.”263 To strike a pro-death
juror, the defense will have to convince the judge that the individual
is incapable of considering mitigation.264 Alternatively, if the
defense believes the prosecution will try to strike a pro-life juror,
defense counsel will have to convince the judge of why that juror is
protected. Either way, the argument made to the court will be
“based on the prospective jurors’ views on punishment,” as elicited

257. Mullin, supra note 96, at 151.
258. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality
opinion).
259. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 21.
260. Id. at 22.
261. Albert W. Alschuler, Celebrating Great Lawyering, 4 OHIO J. CRIM. L.
223, 230 (2006).
262. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 22.
263. Id. at 19.
264. See United States v. Fell, 372 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771 (D. Vt. 2005) (stating
that the sentencer may not refuse to consider evidence relating to the
defendant’s background or upbringing, and such jurors must be excused for
cause).
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through voir dire.265 For the Colorado Method, “attitude toward the
death penalty trumps every other factor usually associated with
jury selection,” such as “race, ethnicity, occupation, [and]
education.”266
Record-Building is most effective when defense attorneys strip
away irrelevant facts and extraneous defenses that are revealed to
influence the juror’s views on capital punishment.267 The Colorado
Method incorporates these so-called “strip questions” into relevant
and case-specific hypotheticals that can break down “typical juror
‘hiding places’ like self-defense, accident, [and] mistaken ID.”268 The
Colorado Method cautions against talking too specifically about the
defendant’s case, however; “doing so conditions the juror to vote for
death in the client’s case.”269 Instead, the Method suggests the
defense attorney “should continue to indicate that she is talking
about a hypothetical case (albeit similar to the client’s case).”270
4. The Trial Overview Stage
When the record can sufficiently shield potential pro-life jurors
from government challenges and/or defeat the government’s
defenses of pro-death jurors, the Colorado Method moves into a
discussion of the structure of a capital trial.271
Initially, the defense confirms that the potential juror is able
to decide whether the prosecution met their burden of proving the
defendant’s guilt based on only the evidence presented at trial.272
Then, the defense makes clear that if the defendant is found guilty,
the trial will progress into the sentencing phase, and the jury’s role
will change.273 The Colorado Method seeks to affirm with each juror
that if—and only if—the penalty phase occurs, each juror will be
called upon to make a unique, individual, and moral judgment
about the sentence the defendant should receive.274 Additional
clarifications may be provided here, such as, “a juror is never
required to impose a death sentence,” or “the only parties in the
courtroom seeking the death penalty are the prosecutors.”275
During the Trial Overview stage, counsel differentiates
between the distinct phases of a capital trial in order to prevent
265. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 18.
266. Toobin, supra note 60.
267. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 20.
268. Paula Sites, Defending a Capital Case, IND. PUB. DEF. COUNCIL 1, 66
(Mar. 2013).
269. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 22.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 23.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 23, 26.
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jurors from incorrectly believing that they are not ultimately
responsible “for determining the sentence in a capital case.”276 First,
the defense underscores that the guilt phase requires jurors to make
a unanimous, factual decision; the sentencing phase asks each
individual juror to arrive at an “intensely personal” decision based
on their own “unique life experience[s], personal philosophy, and
walk in life.”277
Next, the attorney solidifies this notion by emphasizing that
capital jurors are expected to arrive at different results.278 For
example, in the guilt phase, if the jury cannot unanimously decide,
then a “hung jury” exists and a mistrial occurs.279 However, there is
no such thing as a “hung jury” in the sentencing half of a capital
trial; “if any one juror chooses life, based on that juror’s personal
moral judgment, then the defendant will be sentenced to life
imprisonment without release.”280 Through this clarification
process, the Colorado Method corrects the frequent misconception
that the life-or-death responsibility is shared with trial judges and
appellate courts.281
5. The Principle Confirmation Stage
Finally, the Principle Confirmation stage works to ensure any
votes for life will be respected inside the jury room so that those
votes can survive outside of the jury room.282 Considering that
“[m]ost capital juries are destined to undergo a process of
persuading one or more jurors to change their votes to reach
unanimity,” the importance of this process cannot be overstated. 283
Here, counsel asks leading questions “to confirm that the jurors
understand and are willing to make their sentencing trial decisions
in a constitutionally appropriate and lawful manner.”284 The
Principle Confirmation stage requires three kinds of confirmation:
Isolation, Insulation, and Respect.285
During the isolation phase, the defense confirms that the life
276. Id. at 24.
277. Id. at 25.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 38 (2000).
282. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 24. The Colorado Method underscores
“that every juror has a vote and must think for herself about whether to impose
the death penalty or exercise mercy.” GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54. Moreover,
“[t]hey must respect each other’s votes and cannot force others to vote for
death.” Id. at 54–55.
283. Scott E. Sundby, War and Peace in the Jury Room: How Capital Juries
Reach Unanimity, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 107 (May 11, 2010).
284. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 24.
285. Id.
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or death decision “each juror makes in a capital case is an
individual, personal moral judgment,” based upon “each juror’s
personal philosophy, walk in life, and common sense.”286 Next, the
insulation phase requires the defense to ensure that each juror
understands that “she makes her decision with the knowledge and
comfort that it will be respected, she will not be bullied or
intimidated by other jurors during her decision-making process,
and the court and parties will respect her decision.”287 Lastly, the
defense extracts “a commitment from every juror that she will
respect the personal moral judgment made by every other juror on
the ultimate life or death decision–whether she personally agrees
with the other juror’s decision or not.”288 This does not mean that
jurors may avoid deliberation.289 On the contrary, it means that “a
juror is never required to explain, justify, or put into words a vote
for life or a vote for death.”290
With an understanding of David Wymore’s methodology, it is
easy to see why the Colorado Method has been successful at sparing
the lives of capital defendants. With few other comprehensive
techniques for successfully seating a life-leaning jury, however, the
Colorado Method must be scrutinized and, if possible, continually
improved.
III. ANALYSIS
As if the importance of effective voir dire was not made clear
enough, many trial attorneys recognize that “almost every case has
been won or lost by the time the jury is sworn.”291 Current jury
selection practices, however, are simply ineffective at “measuring
death penalty attitudes,” meaning that defense attorneys cannot
adequately contemplate the likelihood that a particular juror would
favor sparing the defendant’s life.292 Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens underscored this notion in 2005:
In case after case many days are spent conducting voir dire
examinations in which prosecutors engage in prolonged questioning
to determine whether the venire person has moral or religious
scruples that would impair her ability to impose the death penalty.
Preoccupation with that issue creates an atmosphere in which
jurors are likely to assume that their primary task is to determine
the penalty for a presumptively guilty defendant. More
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 25.
290. Id.
291.Selecting a jury can be complicated during divisive political times, supra
note 11 (quoting defense attorney Clarence Darrow).
292. Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, An Alternative Method of Capital Jury
Selection, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 171 (1989).
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significantly, because the prosecutor can challenge jurors with
qualms about the death penalty, the process creates a risk that a
fair cross-section of the community will not be represented on the
jury.293

Though Justice Stevens scratches the surface with regard to
the flawed nature of America’s capital punishment system, the total
pervasiveness of capital jury selection is grim. Fortunately, the
Colorado Method may be the best way to overcome the detriments
caused by the death qualification process. In light of the Method’s
recent success in sparing convicted murderer Brendt Christensen
in 2019, an assessment of its effectiveness is warranted. The
following analysis proceeds in three parts: first, this Comment
presents the well-documented detriments of the death qualification
process; second, this Comment explores the how the Colorado
Method confronts and minimizes those detriments; and third, this
Comment highlights potential issues within the Colorado Method
that frustrate its underlying goal of protecting a capital defendant’s
constitutionally guaranteed rights.

A. Problems with Capital Jury Selection
Death qualification “is the worst part of a broken system.”294
At its best, the process is “woefully ineffective at the most
elementary task – weeding out unqualified jurors.”295 In two
prominent 1984 studies, social psychologist and pioneer death
qualification researcher, Dr. Craig Haney, documented some of the
earliest findings regarding the requirement that capital jurors be
death-qualified.296 Haney found that the death qualification process
significantly and impermissibly alters a capital juror’s state of
mind.297 In turn, a capital defendant’s rights and interests are
severely prejudiced.298 Yet, almost fifty years after the Furman
Court held that juries were imposing the death penalty in an
arbitrary and capricious manner, extensive problems with juries
293. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 785 (citing Justice John Paul Stevens,
Remarks at the Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner (Aug. 6, 2005),
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-06-05.html
[perma.cc/UN3V-2ZD3]).
294. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37, at 131 (citing Stephen Gillers,
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 82 (1980)).
295. Blume, Johnson, & Threlkeld, supra note 142, at 1211.
296. Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of
the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 121 (June 1984)
[hereinafter Haney II]; Haney I, supra note 152, at 145.
297. Id. at 131 (stating “[t]he results of this study suggest that jurors may
be strongly influenced by the process of death qualification and approach the
evidentiary stage of a criminal trial in a frame of mind that differs significantly
from that of jurors who have not been exposed to the process.”).
298. Id. at 128–29.
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and their selection still exist.299 Primarily, exposing jurors to the
“unusual and suggestive legal process”300 of death qualification has
the ability to “seriously compromise the fairness and impartiality of
capital juries.”301
Death qualification has been criticized for as long as it has been
implemented,302 yet the “elephant in the room” cannot be
overstated: “death qualification helps the prosecution win the
case.”303 First, death qualification results in a jury primed to convict
a capital defendant. Second, that jury is then more likely to
sentence a capital defendant to death. Third, death qualification
produces an unrepresentative cross-section of the community.
Fourth, death qualification causes potential jurors to modify their
conduct.
1. Death Qualification Produces a Jury Primed to Convict
First, exposure to the death qualification process primes jurors
to believe the defendant is guilty before the trial even begins.304
Numerous courts now acknowledge how “the mere mention” of
punishment before trial can “seriously distort [the jury’s] decisionmaking process, influence a juror’s role as fact finder, and constitute
reversible error.”305 In fact, one tenth of death-qualified jurors are
“conscious of and willing to admit that the jury selection process
made them think the defendant was probably guilty” before the trial
ever began.306 While jurors certainly expect some likelihood that the
defendant may be guilty (otherwise there would be no reason for a
jury trial in the first place), completing the death qualification
process increases jurors’ estimation of conviction.307 Further, when
compared to “excludable jurors, death-qualified jurors have
attitudes that predispose them toward the prosecution[’s] point of
view and toward conviction.”308 This also means that deathqualified jurors are less trusting of defense attorneys,309 thereby
establishing a juror pool that is distinctly “pro-prosecution” from
the very beginning.310

299. Bowers, supra note 28, at 1053 (referencing Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972)).
300. Haney II, supra note 296, at 121.
301. Haney I, supra note 152, at 145.
302. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37, at 148.
303. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 777 (citing Andrea D. Lyon, The Capital
Jury, Open Discussion, 80 IND. L.J. 60, 64 (2005)).
304. Cox & Tanford, supra note 292, at 169.
305. Haney I, supra note 152, at 146.
306. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 85.
307. Haney II, supra note 296, at 128.
308. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 105, at 39.
309. Id. at 44.
310. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 785 (citing FLEURY-STEINER, supra note
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This premature determination of guilt is largely the result of
the penalty phase being discussed “long before penalty is
relevant.”311 Social psychological research “suggests that thinking
about or imagining an event increases our subjective estimate that
it will occur.”312 Frustratingly, this means that “the more the court
dwells on the penalty-phase procedures, [even] in a valiant effort to
be completely clear, the clearer becomes the implication that the
penalty phase is likely to occur.”313 Evidently, jurors quickly forget
about the presumption of innocence as they are thrust into
deliberating postconviction events.314
In 1968, the Witherspoon Court, “acknowledged that
defendants should not be subjected to the judgment of a ‘tribunal
organized to convict.’”315 Yet, the mere fact “that death-qualified
jurors are more likely to vote for conviction represents an obvious
threat to the fairness of the tribunal, and is especially serious since
it is an imbalance to the detriment of the defense.”316
2. Death Qualification Results in a Jury Likely to Sentence
a Capital Defendant to Death
In addition to making jurors more likely to convict a capital
defendant in the guilt phase, death qualification also results in
those jurors being primed to vote for a death sentence in the penalty
phase.317 Again, this prejudicial bias toward death is a product of
repeated exposure to discussing penalty before the trial begins.318
The death qualification process and the kind of questioning it
necessitates communicates to veniremen that the penalty phase is
inevitable in the forthcoming trial.319 However, when guilt seems
more likely, capital jurors begin to believe that a sentence of death
is more appropriate.320 Forcing potential jurors to “come to terms”
179).
311. Haney I, supra note 152, at 133.
312. Haney II, supra note 296, at 129.
313. Haney I, supra note 152, at 138.
314. Id. at 133.
315. Haney II, supra note 296, at 131 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968)).
316. Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson, & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The
Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the
Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 59–60 (1984) (citing Ballew
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 236 (1978)).
317. See Haney I, supra note 152, at 139 (lamenting that, in an attempt to
“ensure that veniremen will keep an ‘open mind’ in the penalty phase,” the use
of death qualification may instead “help to close their minds at the guilt phase”).
318. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 65.
319. Haney I, supra note 152, at 136.
320. Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of
Death Qualification, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 693–94 (2002) [hereinafter Rozelle
II].
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with the death penalty “far earlier than they must actually decide
upon it” may impair the juror with respect to both the “ultimate
issue” as well as “the series of prior decisions it subsumes.”321 Thus,
many jurors “have been led toward guilt and death by the voir dire
questioning without realizing it,” or, worse, “may have realized it
but been unwilling to admit as much.”322
When jurors become biased to vote for death, the end result is
desensitization.323 Repeated discussion of the penalty phase
“exposes prospective jurors to the most emotional and profound
issue that can be confronted in human experience – life and
death.”324 This constant re-imagining of an event “makes its
cognitive category, as well as the necessary sequence of events that
precede it, more available and easier to mentally access.”325
Subsequently, death qualified jurors become subconsciously “less
frightened and intimidated” by the possibility of imposing the death
sentence.326 The California Supreme Court eloquently underscored
this argument in Hovey v. Superior Court of Alameda County:
For many people, even those who are in favor of the death penalty,
the prospect of having to make a personal decision about whether
another human is to live or die poses an understandably
intimidating duty . . . When people are continually exposed to a
stimulus which is intimidating or frightening to them, they become
desensitized to what they earlier found to be threatening. In a
capital voir dire, prospective jurors are repeatedly prompted to
think about the penalty decision they may later be called upon to
make. What was initially regarded as an onerous choice, inspiring
caution and hesitation, may be more readily undertaken simply
because of the repeated exposure to the idea of taking a life.327

As a result, death qualification causes jurors to engage in
premature decision-making when it comes to the defendant’s guilt
and appropriate sentence. Death-qualified jurors enter the
courtroom with “predispositions that result in nearly half of them
deciding the penalty before they even hear the evidence or legal

321. Haney I, supra note 152, at 141.
322. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 793 (citing Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27,
at 65).
323. Robert M. Berry, Remedies to the Dilemma of Death-Qualified Juries,
8 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 479, 494 (1986) (explaining that “[e]xtended
discussions of penalty may imply that the defendant is guilty, and witnessing
such debate may desensitize the observing juror to the death penalty.”); see also
Haney II, supra note 296, at 130 (revealing “[d]eath qualification may also
desensitize jurors to conviction in a capital case and to the imposition of the
death penalty.”).
324. Haney I, supra note 152, at 140.
325. Id. at 139.
326. Haney II, supra note 296, at 130.
327. Hovey v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cty., 616 P.2d 1301, 1350 (Cal. 1980).
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standards they are supposed to be considering.”328 Thus, it is
unsurprising that jurors often decide – and decide strongly329 –
what they believe the penalty should be before the conclusion of the
guilt phase.330 “After days, weeks, or even months of hearing the
defendant dehumanized and described as deviant, different, and
dangerous, ‘jurors’ attitudes and impressions have crystallized and
rigidified’ before any attempt is made to humanize the defendant in
the punishment phase.”331
Even when conducted on an “individual, sequestered basis,”
death qualification still demands that each juror traverse this
emotional hurdle “before he or she can be accepted.”332 Jurors thus
come to understand “that, in someone’s opinion, at least, the case
they are about to hear is worth of the most horrible and extreme
punishment the law permits.”333 The bottom line is grave: becoming
desensitized to the emotional nature of the death penalty inquiry
causes jurors to act “as though the issue was more or less
routine.”334 In sum, death qualification “primes [jurors] to hand
down the harshest available sentence.”335 Consequently, procedural
safeguards “such as bifurcating the trial, allowing presentation of
mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase, and the use of
jury instructions aimed at guiding sentencing discretion are of little
use if jurors have already decided what the penalty should be.”336
Thus, “[i]n its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty,
the State produce[s] a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man
to die.”337
3. Death Qualification Produces an Unrepresentative CrossSection of the Community
A jury pool “must represent a cross section of the community,”
meaning that a proportionate representation of age, sex, and
minority characteristics should be present.338 However, capital
328. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 84.
329. Id. at 57.
330. Id. at 56.
331. Id. at 60.
332. Haney I, supra note 152, at 140.
333. Id. at 142.
334. Id. at 141.
335. Bidish J. Sarma, Challenges and Opportunities in Bringing the Lessons
of Cultural Competence to Bear on Capital Jury Selection, 24 U. MEM. L. REV.
907, 914 (2012).
336. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 56.
337. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 772 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 520–21 (1968)).
338. Mullin, supra note 96, at 144. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
538 (1975) (“the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which
juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the
community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.”).
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juries fall short of this legal standard as they do not “reflect the
scope of the public’s attitude toward death as a sanction, and
thereby may . . . deprive[] the defendant of his 6th amendment right
to an impartial jury.”339 As evidenced, jurors who complete the
death qualification process differ from non-death-qualified jurors
“in ways that were consistently prejudicial to the interests and
rights of defendants.”340
The cause of this deprivation is death qualification’s failure to
exclude “jurors who believe death is the only acceptable
punishment,” while simultaneously eliminating anyone “who
actually could impose death” despite some reservations.341 Two to
eight individuals seated on a twelve-person jury “are likely to be
automatic death penalty jurors, while less that one will be an
automatic life penalty juror.”342 Further, death qualification
eliminates seventy percent of potential jurors because of their
strong opposition to capital punishment, thereby removing some of
the strongest advocates of mercy, due process, and the defendant’s
point of view.343 Moreover, by excluding “a much higher percentage
of anti-death penalty jurors,” the prosecution may actually “have
enough peremptory strikes available to prevent any individual with
even minor qualms about the death penalty from making it on to
the jury.”344 Consequentially, the number of “prosecution-oriented”
individuals who survive death qualification is over-representative
of the population.345
Intended to compose an impartial jury, this “culling of
potential jurors based on their moral views” produces a jury that
both looks and thinks quite differently from the community it
supposedly represents.346 Unsurprisingly, death qualification also
discriminates against minorities, particularly African Americans
and women.347 In fact, once “the prosecution preemptively strikes
any potential juror who forecloses the possibility of a death
339. Faye Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples,
Jury Bias, and Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumption in the Law, 5
HARV. L. REV. 53, 53 (1970).
340. Haney II, supra note 296, at 129.
341. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 84.
342. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 789.
343. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 105, at 42, 44.
344. Sarma, supra note 335, at 919. Conversely, the defense “may struggle
to eliminate all of the folks near the ‘automatic-death’ end of the spectrum.” Id.
345. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 61.
346. Babcock, supra note 114, at 550.
347. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 105, at 46. See Melynda J. Price,
Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57,
103–04 (2009) (explaining that “[p]ersons who oppose the death penalty are not
evenly distributed throughout the population,” which results in Black
individuals being “more likely to be disqualified from service based on attitudes
toward the death penalty.”).
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sentence, the remaining potential jurors are often white, male,
protestant, and less educated than the overall jury pool which
included those who would not impose a death sentence.”348
Additionally, “death qualification’s homogenization of the jury
decreases accuracy in fact-finding”349
because individuals
“understand our perceptions as congruent with the framework
already entrenched in our own minds.”350 After the death
qualification process inadvertently creates “certain expectations
and preconceptions in the minds of the jurors about the legal case
that is to follow,” capital jurors begin to “receive and interpret
evidence” in a manner consistent with those preconceptions.351 This
results in “reduce[d] diversity of ideas and perceptions causing juror
deliberation to suffer.”352
By presenting “the often shocking guilt phase evidence” first,
“a powerful and persistent picture of aggravation” is formed in the
minds of jurors.353 The conviction-prone and death-prone
perspectives of death qualified juries “often persist in the face of
powerful contradictory evidence.”354 Not only do death-qualified
jurors “start out less favorable to the defense attorney,” they are
also substantially less willing to contemplate issues raised by the
defense.355 This pitfall “forces a defendant whose life is at stake to
assume a special handicap in his contest with the state.”356
Accordingly, death qualified jurors “might literally see a different
case,” one “that conforms to their expectation of guilt and one that
is far more unfavorable to the defendant.”357 Ultimately, “capital
348. Dillard, supra note 88, at 1001–02 (citing Brooke Butler & Adina W.
Wasserman, The Role of Death Qualification in Venirepersons’ Attitudes
Toward the Insanity Defense, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1744, 1745–46
(2006)). See Sarma, supra note 335, at 917 (asserting that, although “jurors may
differ from defendants on a range of cultural indices, put simply, ‘compared to
juries seated in nondeath cases, [capital jurors] are disproportionately white,
male, older, and more religiously and politically conservative.’” (citing Mona
Lynch & Craig Haney, Mapping the Racial Bias of the White Male Capital
Juror: Jury Composition and the “Empathic Divide”, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 69,
73 (2011))).
349. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 780 (citing Hovey v. Super. Ct. of Alameda
Cty., 616 P.2d 1301, 1312–13 (Cal. 1980)).
350. Id. (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1110, 1119 (2006) (explaining that “[t]he general phenomenon—normative
bias—is well supported by evidence of confirmation bias, by which people tend
to seek out, and to believe, evidence that supports their own antecedent
views.”)).
351. Haney II, supra note 296, at 130.
352. Nason, supra note 110, at 222 (citing Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth,
supra note 316, at 75–76).
353. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 60.
354. Haney II, supra note 296, at 131.
355. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 105, at 44.
356. Id. at 46.
357. Haney II, supra note 296, at 131 (emphasis in original).
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4. Death Qualification Causes Jurors to Modify Their
Responses
“Identifying jurors who are subject to challenges for cause is an
indispensable component of due process.”359 This effort is
frustrated, however, when jurors modify their responses during voir
dire.360 There are two main factors that cause jurors to modify “their
behavior [and] their statements” in response to death qualification
questioning: the required public affirmation and the desire to please
authority figures.361
First, death qualification inherently “requires each qualified
juror to publicly affirm their willingness to take the most extreme
legal action ever available to a juror.”362 However, social
psychologists assert that this kind of “active, public advocacy of a
position intensifies one’s belief in it.”363 Especially when conducted
in open court, this has the potential to create “a climate of deathpenalty support” as veniremen watch their peers repeatedly
“express a willingness to impose the penalty”364 in order to dodge
disqualification. Worse, this compelled proclamation conveys “that
the judge and both attorneys – including defense counsel – all
believe that the defendant is guilty, and that the only important
task remaining is to find enough jurors who can do what is
necessary.”365 Jurors then view their responsibility solely as
ensuring a death sentence is rendered because, from their
perspective, that is what the court wants.366 The intensity of this
358. Haney, Hurtado, & Vega, supra note 128, at 631.
359. Roan, supra note 116 (citing U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV).
360. Haney II, supra note 296, at 122.
361. Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, Lawyers and Jurors:
Interrogating Voir Dire Strategies by Analyzing Conversations, 16 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 515, 519 (Sept. 2019).
362. Haney I, supra note 152, at 143.
363. Haney II, supra note 296, at 130. See Haney I, supra note 152, at 143
(highlighting that “[t]he act of publicly proclaiming one’s willingness to impose
the death penalty is likely to intensify commitment to that course of action”).
364. Haney I, supra note 152, at 140.
365. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 792 (citing Hovey v. Super. Ct. of Alameda
Cty., 616 P.2d 1301, 1351 (Cal. 1980); CRAIG HANEY, THE BIASING EFFECTS OF
THE DEATH QUALIFICATION PROCESS (pre-published draft) (1979)).
366. As public defender Ira Mickenberg explains, “[w]hen asked questions
about the criminal justice system, prospective jurors know what the ‘right’ or
expected answer is.” IRA MICKENBERG, N.C. DEF. TRIAL SCH., VOIR DIRE & JURY
SELECTION, at 2–3 (2011) (available at ncids.org/defender%20training/
2011defendertrialschool/voirdire.pdf [perma.cc/FV9V-K6A6]). “Jurors will
almost always give the ‘right’ answer to avoid getting in trouble with the court,
to avoid seeming to be a troublemaker, and to avoid looking stupid in front of
their peers.” Id. at 3. In this way, death qualification is very much akin to a test

2021]

Escaping Death

291

notion continues to increase when, as commonly happens, “people
who almost certainly should have been disqualified as automatic
death penalty (ADP) jurors were nevertheless seated on capital
juries.”367
Second, potential jurors invariably try to please the court and,
in doing so, “will actually alter their expressed attitudes when
questioned by” or in the presence of a judge.368 When placed in
“novel or unfamiliar situations,” individuals are “especially
sensitive to cues from authority figures and apparently
knowledgeable others.”369 Moreover, when a potential juror “says
one thing but actually means another[,] . . . [f]or the sake of judicial
economy and expediency, judges will quickly accept the juror’s
words at face value.”370 In a question-and-answer situation, “two
processes are at work: information is being exchanged and a social
relationship is being created, maintained or, in some cases,
weakened.”371 As such, it is understood that “the people who answer
the questions usually try to please the questioner.”372
Jury selection is already an intimidating “process of
elimination” that is executed under oath, inside a courthouse, in
front of a judge, several attorneys, and an armed bailiff.373
Essentially, “[i]t’s set up to scare you to death.”374 Realizing “that
the judge and attorneys possess the power to determine if they are
fit to serve on the jury,” jurors tend to respond in “less truthful but
socially desirable ways to garner a favorable evaluation from the
judge” or attorneys.375 Consequently, jurors put forth what they
think is the “correct answer to the question.”376 In fact, some
commentators have cited the Milgram experiment377 when
discussing death qualification, pointing out that, “if volunteers are
willing to follow the rather ambivalent orders of doctors in an
experiment, those who are told by a judge that the rule of law
that potential jurors desperately want to pass.
367. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 58.
368. Matlon, supra note 104, at 2–3.
369. Haney II, supra note 296, at 129.
370. Richard S. Jaffe et al., Capital Cases: Ten Principles for Individualized
Voir Dire on the Death Penalty, JAFFE, HANLE, WHISONANT & KNIGHT (June 6,
2016), rjaffelaw.com/articles/2016/june/ten-principles-for-individualized-voirdire-on-t/ [perma.cc/FQ73-YNKM].
371. Roger W. Shuy, How a Judge’s Voir Dire Can Teach a Jury What to
Say, 6 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 207, 208 (1995).
372. Id.
373. Andrea D. Lyon, The Negative Effects of Capital Jury Selection, 80 IND.
L.J. 52, 53 (2005).
374. Id.
375. Kovera, Dickson, & Cutler, supra note 94, at 164.
376. Lyon, supra note 373 (internal punctuation omitted).
377. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 113–22
(1974) (concluding that test subjects will obey the directives of authority figures,
even when directed to perform acts that conflict with their conscience).
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requires them to consider the death penalty are likely to be affected
in some way.”378
Witnessing other disqualifications additionally convinces
jurors that the judge and the prosecution “personally favor the
death penalty.”379 This may then cause these jurors to advocate
more aggressively for the death penalty in deliberations.380 The
exclusions witnessed by surviving veniremen are then perceived as
“official and personal.”381 When jurors feel as though they must
answer with the “right” or “good” answer, dubbed the “social
desirability bias,” they fall prey to the “many trappings of official
power and formality” within the courtroom setting, and ultimately
offer answers intended to “satisfy the judge and the attorneys”
rather than answers that honestly convey any biases.382
By and large, capital jurors harbor “disproportionately
punitive orientations toward crime and criminal justice.”383 The
death qualification process causes potential jurors to want to
provide the court with the “correct” answer, which results in a
desensitized and unrepresentative jury that is distrustful of the
defense, is more likely to find a capital defendant guilty, is more
likely to sentence a convicted defendant to death, and is primed to
interpret evidence differently.384 The death qualification process
“systematically distorts the attitudes of the jury in a direction that
discriminates against the defendant and undermines the
protections of due process.”385 Accordingly, the practice of death
qualification presses “a thumb on the prosecutor’s side of the
scale.”386 To produce truthful, insightful, and relevant discussion,
then, defense attorneys must recognize how exceedingly crucial
their interaction with each potential juror is.387

B. Advantages of Using the Colorado Method
Capital defense lawyers have traditionally “done a remarkably
poor job in voir dire and jury selection.”388 The cards have been

378. Adam M. Clark, An Investigation of Death Qualification as a Violation
of the Rights of Jurors, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 11 (2006).
379. Haney II, supra note 296, at 130.
380. Id.
381. Haney I, supra note 152, at 144.
382. Ken Broda-Bahm, Getting Beyond “Can You Be Fair?” Framing Your
Cause Questions, JURY EXPERT, at 1, 2 (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter Broda-Bahm
II].
383. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 785 (citing FLEURY-STEINER, supra note
180).
384. Haney II, supra note 296.
385. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 105, at 48.
386. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 771.
387. Shuy, supra note 371.
388. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 18.
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stacked against them, though; with regard to capital jury selection,
the aforementioned processing effects are latent but lethal
“currents of prejudice.”389 Nonetheless, the practice of death
qualification remains judicially approved.390 As such, capital
defendants have no say in whether death qualification will occur,
and “are left only with difficult tactical decisions” about how to best
avoid exacerbating the processing effects inherently produced by a
death penalty trial.391
“Scholars have long argued that the biases of the deathqualified jury violate due process,” especially since such “jurors will
reject credible evidence of affirmative defenses.”392 In 1980, Haney’s
analysis regarding the processing effects of death qualification left
“most observers generally pessimistic that the effects [could] be
neutralized as long as ‘[l]egally mandated procedures compel
attorneys . . . to engage in lengthy discussions about death penalty
attitudes with prospective jurors . . . .’”393 Of course, fifteen years
later, the Colorado Method emerged.394
By framing the penalty phase as a “deeply personal choice,”
rather than the product of group collaboration, the Colorado Method
presents reaching a verdict as an “individual moral judgment”
rather than a group decision.395 These subtle communicative
distinctions have a massive impact: as District Attorney George H.
Brauchler underscores, “[w]hen the judge says it’s a profoundly
reasoned moral judgment and says it 10 times, you always know
that any death penalty case could” result in a life sentence—even
for the most vile of defendants.396 Accordingly, it is imperative to
recognize how exceedingly hard the Colorado Method works to
improve and equalize the capital jury selection process.
The benefits of utilizing the Colorado Method are far-reaching:
First, the preliminary rating helps streamline jury selection;
Second, the Information-Gathering stage effectively uncovers
underlying biases; Third, the Trial Overview stage substantially
minimizes processing effects; Fourth, the Principle Confirmation
stage protects votes for life; and Fifth, the Colorado Method
advantageously includes the court in its process.

389. Initial Brief of Appellant at 22, Durousseau v. Florida, No. SC 15–1276
(Fla. Dec. 3, 2015).
390. Haney I, supra note 152, at 145.
391. Id.
392. Dillard, supra note 88, at 1003.
393. Berry, supra note 323 (citing Craig Haney, Juries and the Death
Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 512, 521
(1980)).
394. David Wymore first introduced the Colorado Method in 1995. Ingold,
supra note 182.
395. Broda-Bahm I, supra note 3.
396. La Ganga, supra note 2.

294

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[54:1

1. The Preliminary Ranking Streamlines the Initial Jury
Selection Processes
The Colorado Method begins by rating jurors from one to seven
in accordance with their views on the death penalty and their ability
(or refusal) to consider mitigating evidence at trial.397 The main
benefit of this approach is that it serves to shape the defense team’s
goals with regard to each potential juror, thereby facilitating “clear
team communication and collaboration.”398 When the defense works
as a unitary front, the defendant’s interests are best effectuated.
Before this ranking even occurs, however, the Colorado Method
encourages defense counsel to request a jury questionnaire.399 By
doing so, the Colorado Method “increases the likelihood the parties
can agree on the excusal of ‘extreme’ jurors who are impaired . . .
and gives the parties time to prepare tailored and targeted
questioning of the jurors.”400 In fact, utilizing juror questionnaires
allows potential jurors to write out their responses in their own
words and in the privacy of their own home, thus offering more
candid responses which better identify bias.401 Accordingly, both
parties “can quickly pinpoint . . . specific areas that require
individual follow-up questioning.”402 This crucial preliminary stage
forges a path to truly understanding what makes each juror tick.
2. The Information-Gathering Stage Attempts to Best
Understand Each Juror’s Psyche
Closed and “affectively flat” questions are most frequently used
during general voir dire.403 Yet, the Information-Gathering stage
instead employs open-ended questions to dig deep into a juror’s
psyche to uncover any latent prejudices.404 This line of questioning
essentially explores how the individual arrived at their own moral
code and the ways in which it manifests in their everyday
experiences.405 “Prospective jurors have a host of attitudes, relevant
experiences, and potential biases,” each representing a complex
background that can materially impact that persons’ decision
making.406 Through the Information-Gathering stage, the Colorado
397. See supra Part II(C)(1) (detailing the preliminary ranking stage).
398. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 19.
399. Id. at 21
400. Id.
401. Matlon, supra note 104, at 5–6.
402. Id. at 6.
403. Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 361, at 540.
404. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 21.
405. Id.
406. Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green
Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1179, 1179 (2003).

2021]

Escaping Death

295

Method best equips defense attorneys to prevent or substantially
reduce processing effects by recognizing and counteracting the
intricacies of the human psyche. 407
Utilizing open-ended questions gives the respondent
“permission” to reveal his or her sincerely-held beliefs, and thus
allows attorneys to quickly and more candidly pinpoint potential
prejudices.408 Honest answers to these inquiries allow the defense
to relay that “[m]any people have personal, moral, or philosophical
opposition to the death penalty yet serve on a capital jury,” thus
reducing any confusion or apprehension regarding the legal process
to come.409 In this way, the Colorado Method counteracts the
desensitization of the death qualification process by placing the
“enormity and gravity of the criminal conduct alleged in the case
front and center.”410 The sooner potential jurors recognize their
individual responsibility in the sentencing phase, the more
impenetrable they become to the pervasive influence of a pro-death
juror.
3. The Trial Overview Stage Minimizes Processing Effects
The Trial Overview stage is perhaps the most important part
of the Colorado Method because it assists defense counsel in
negating some of the processing effects stemming from repeated
exposure to the discussion of penalty. A “large portion” of capital
jurors have historically misunderstood and misapplied “the
constitutional principles that govern” a death-eligible case.411 For
example, nearly one third of death-qualified jurors believe that “a
defendant who fails to testify is probably guilty.”412 Knowing that
death-qualified jurors are “less likely to consider mercy, more likely
to favor harsh punishment as a means of reducing crime, and more
likely to believe in the strict enforcement of all laws, no matter what
the consequences,”413 it is unequivocally important for the defense
team to correct any legal misunderstandings during this stage in
order to prevent any perpetuation of processing effects. This stage
requires defense counsel to assert that, “if the result is ‘not guilty,’
the case is over” and the juror will not have to consider the death
penalty at all.414 In turn, this confirmation has the potential to avoid
the adverse health effects capital jurors may suffer by eliminating
the anxiety surrounding death qualification.

407. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 20.
408. Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 361, at 523.
409. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 23.
410. Id. at 20.
411. Id. at 18.
412. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 105, at 43.
413. Id. at 43–44.
414. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 23.
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Here, the attorneys break down what the bifurcation and
unitary jury requirements really mean: a juror’s duty is marginally
different in the separate phases of a capital trial.415 Further, by
underscoring that the sentencing verdict is not required to be
unanimous, the Colorado Method empowers and prepares jurors to
make a “lawful, legitimate, and appropriate,” though perhaps nonunanimous, decision.416 When the jurors understand that sparing
the defendant from the death penalty is as straightforward as one
juror voting for life, the issues regarding capital jurors’ premature
decision-making may be considerably curtailed. In this instance,
the selected jurors will begin to interpret the evidence presented in
a way that is constantly evaluating whether the defendant deserves
to die because of it, rather than searching for ways the evidence can
align with their belief in the defendant’s guilt.
The Trial Overview stage is designed to inform jurors that the
legal system expects capital jurors to “arrive at different results”
because it is the responsibility of each juror, individually, to give
their own consideration to mitigation.417 Though the death penalty
“is supposed to be reserved for only the worst of the worst crimes,”418
subjecting jurors to death qualification results in the poisonous
inference that “the matter is far less consequential than they would
otherwise have thought.”419 By thoroughly engaging in the Trial
Overview stage, however, defense attorneys legitimize the jury’s
authority to impose a life sentence and, ultimately, can re-sensitize
the jury to the gravity of a death sentence thereby making it
exceedingly difficult to impose.
4. The Principle Confirmation Stage Empowers Pro-Life
Jurors to Stand Their Ground
The goal of the Principle Confirmation stage is to teach prodeath jurors how to respect pro-life jurors, while simultaneously
creating safeguards for those pro-life jurors to resist succumbing to
the pressure of the deliberation room.420 During sentencing
deliberations, many “pro-death jurors employ coercive tactics and
bullying against jurors favoring life.”421 Thus, the Colorado Method
excels by placing a great weight on informing potential jurors “that
they have the right to be treated with respect and dignity
throughout the voir dire and trial process” in order to help them

415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 25.
418. Arbitrariness, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2017),
deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/arbitrariness [perma.cc/V998-VD3Z].
419. Haney I, supra note 152, at 141.
420. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 23.
421. Id. at 19.
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“understand and exercise the tremendous individual, personal
[and] moral responsibility they will be given,” namely, the decision
of whether “another human being . . . lives or dies.”422 This emphasis
on respect highlights the defense lawyer’s most fundamental task:
“provid[ing] possible life holdouts the tools in advance to resist the
pressures of the majority once they retire to the jury room.”423
5. The Colorado Method Advantageously Utilizes the Power
of the Court
Finally, the Colorado Method reduces the inevitability that
jurors may modify their responses to please the judge by fully
including the judge in its methodology. “In a capital case, the judge
cannot simply set the stage and let the lawyers conduct the jury
seating”424 – there is too much on the line. Instead, the judge “must
actively manage and control” the jury selection process.425 Of
course, the interference of the judge can substantially impair the
strategy of either party’s voir dire, so the Colorado Method set out
to change that.
Initially, defense attorneys are encouraged to discuss with the
court the language to be used during voir dire before the voir dire
actually begins. By refraining from suggesting the jurors need to be
“fair” or “appropriate” for the case, the judge has the ability to
negate the feeling that the jurors are being evaluated or
interviewed.426 Rather, the Colorado Method urges judges to issue
an instruction:
Before we begin, I would like to explain that there are no ‘right’ or
‘wrong’ answers to any of the questions that will be posed to you
today. Citizens in our community have and are entitled to hold
different views and perspectives on many topics, and the same holds
true for jurors. You will all be treated with dignity and respect, and
I simply ask you to provide honest and complete answers.427

This kind of preemptive communication (between defense
counsel and judge as well as between judge and potential juror) is
greatly beneficial to the Colorado Method’s cause. Immediately, the
judge is on the same page as the defense team and the atmosphere
parallels what the Colorado Method teaches. Death qualification
renders jurors “especially receptive to arguments that they must
follow the implicit ‘promise’ made to the court.”428 Thus, when it

422. Id. at 20.
423. Sundby, supra note 283, at 148–49.
424. WOSJE, BRUNSON, & BURNS, supra note 99, at 87.
425. Id.
426. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 20.
427. Id.
428. Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 389, at 20.
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comes time for the defense to conduct voir dire, the juror will be
comfortable hearing these kinds of phrases after hearing them
directly from the supreme authority in the room. The Method
suggests several other kinds of proposed jury instructions that
defense teams should use, including instructions specifically
addressing the processing effects produced by pre-trial penalty
questioning.429 Ultimately, by confronting death qualification’s
processing effects head-on, the Colorado Method is actively working
toward eliminating them altogether.
The Colorado Method was established to help boost the number
of life-leaning jurors seated to decide the fate of capital
defendants.430 After examining the gains that are possible through
using the Colorado Method, its prominence becomes clear. First, the
preliminary rating helps streamline jury selection; Second, the
Information-Gathering stage effectively uncovers underlying
biases; Third, the Trial Overview stage substantially minimizes
processing effects; Fourth, the Principle Confirmation stage
protects votes for life; and Fifth, the Colorado Method utilizes the
power of the court to its advantage.

C. Potential Issues With The Colorado Method
While its nationwide recognition is still growing, the enigmatic
Colorado Method has already been successful at selecting a capital
jury designed to render a life sentence in the face of evil—just ask
James Holmes or Brendt Christensen.431 However, the technique is
not infallible. After murdering three and injuring more than 250
others in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
was sentenced to death on May 15, 2015,432 despite his attorneys
following the Colorado Method.433
429. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 20 (stating that “[r]esearch shows that
jurors who are questioned about their punishment views before a trial even
begins are more likely to convict the defendant and to sentence the defendant
to death.”).
430. As Rubenstein explains, the Colorado Method “provides defense
counsel with the skills and techniques . . . to conduct capital voir dire in a
manner that maximizes the opportunity to obtain life verdicts.” Id. at 18.
431. James Holmes’ attorney, Tamara Brady, “didn’t plan to defend death
penalty cases.” Greene, supra note 6. Rather, she admits that, as a young public
defender, she “naively assumed that Wymore and the people of his generation
would be there to handle those cases.” Id. Brady “retired from capital defense
shortly after persuading Holmes’ jury in 2015 to spare him from death.” Id.
432. Andy Thibault, Tom Winter, & Jon Schuppe, Tsarnaev Sentenced to
Death in Boston Bombing Trial, NBC NEWS (May 15, 2015),
www.nbcnews.com/storyline/boston-bombing-trial/boston-bombing-trial-juryreaches-verdict-penalty-phase-n359731 [perma.cc/Q29W-A595].
433. Frederick Leatherman, Using the Colorado Method of Jury Selection in
Tsarnaev Death Penalty Trial, SHADOW PROOF (Jan. 2, 2015), shadowproof.com/
2015/01/02/using-the-colorado-method-of-jury-selection-in-tsarnaev-death-
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Due to the complex nature of any capital punishment trial, the
methods used to protect a defendant with his life on the line should
constantly be re-evaluated and, if possible, improved. With regard
to the Colorado Method, three potential issues arise: (1) the sevenpoint scale has too much overlap; (2) the Colorado Method uses
faulty questioning techniques; and (3) the Colorado Method relies
too heavily on rehabilitation. There is no doubt that “extracting
reliable information regarding venire members’ views on the death
penalty is a delicate operation,” and the same can be said for the
methodology used to do so.434
1.

The Preliminary Ranking’s Seven-Point Scale Has Too
Much Overlap

While the Colorado Method’s Preliminary Ranking is beneficial
for streamlining voir dire preparation, its seven-point scale does not
sufficiently delineate the categories of jurors it attempts to create.
Instead of seven clearly different types of jurors, the scale creates
two obvious categories (categories one and seven), while categories
two through six become indistinguishable. As author Brandon
Garrett illustrates:
A “one” will never vote for the death penalty and is vocally opposed
to it . . . . A two or a three believes in the death penalty but does not
have strong reasons to be for it, and, depending on the person, can
feel compassion for a criminal. If you are a four or five, you
comfortably support the death penalty and think it is a “good thing”
to have . . . . If you are a six, you are a natural “head nodder”
whenever the prosecution talks . . . . If you are a seven, you will
automatically sentence any convicted murderer to death, no matter

penalty-trial/ [perma.cc/BW7A-FL5V]. On July 31, 2020, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s death sentence, reasoning that “the
judge who oversaw the case did not adequately screen jurors for potential
biases.” Alanna Durkin Richer, Court overturns Boston Marathon bomber’s
death sentence, AP NEWS (July 31, 2020), apnews.com/article/dzhokhartsarnaev-trials-boston-marathon-bombing-ap-top-news-bombingsaf38a703ab88fe922629dcc254cb41df [perma.cc/S3VH-B6VM]. The court
“ordered a new penalty-phase trial on whether the 27-year-old Tsarnaev should
be executed for the attack that killed three people and wounded more than 260
others.” Id. The Justice Department is expected to ask the Supreme Court to
reinstate Tsarnaev’s death sentence and thus avoid a penalty phase re-trial.
Deborah Becker, What To Expect As Debate About Tsarnaev’s Death Sentence
Resurfaces,
WBUR NEWS
(Aug.
21,
2020),
www.wbur.org/news/
2020/08/21/tsarnaev-death-sentence-retrial
[perma.cc/6CCC-52VX].
If
Tsarnaev is granted a retrial, the author suspects his defense counsel will
utilize the Colorado Method, but it remains to be seen whether it will work. Id.
434. Motion to Establish Jury Selection Procedures at 34, United States v.
Christensen, No. 17-20037 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2019).
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what.435

With no clear boundaries, the united front the Method intends
to facilitate is seriously diminished. For defense attorneys,
understanding and applying the Preliminary Ranking may become
an unwelcome rigidity to their already overwhelming duty. At best,
the seven-point scale seems frivolous, at worst, a waste of the
defense’s time.
2. The Colorado Method Uses Faulty Questioning
Techniques
The Colorado Method excels by initially understanding that
the success of every communication “depends not only on what
people say but also on their approach to the interaction.”436
Importantly, the “form, tone, and implication” of questions asked
during death qualification can impair interactions with jurors and
“worsen the basic defects that are built directly into the process
itself.”437 During the Information-Gathering stage, the Colorado
Method instructs defense attorneys to pose hypothetical and
leading questions to determine a potential juror’s fitness to serve on
a capital jury.438 However, both of these questioning formats have
been largely criticized, further exacerbating the disservices done by
death qualification.439
First, the Colorado Method encourages defense attorneys to
posit hypothetical situations to potential jurors, containing similar
fact patterns and circumstances to the case at issue.440 The Colorado
Method asserts that having jurors “predict their own behavior” in a
hypothetical situation assists attorneys in assessing “their ability
to impose the death penalty,” as well as the likelihood they will
follow through.441 While using hypotheticals makes sense to uncover
a juror’s inclination to vote for life or death, frustratingly, the act of
posing a hypothetical problem can “itself change the beliefs” of the
juror.”442 Accordingly, the Colorado Method’s use of hypothetical
435. GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54.
436. Shuy, supra note 371.
437. Haney I, supra note 152, at 134.
438. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 20–21.
439. See MICKENBERG, supra note 366 (providing a detailed report of the
pitfalls of jury selection). By asking leading and hypothetical questions, defense
attorneys often receive “aspirational answers,” meaning that “the juror is just
giving us what she knows we want to hear, and we don’t know anything about
her.” Id. at 1, 3. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that “determinations
of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain
results in the manner of a catechism.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424.
440. Rubenstein, supra note 19, at 20–21.
441. Haney II, supra note 296, at 129.
442. John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations of
the Event: An Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J.
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questions may actually result in jurors that are “significantly more
likely” to believe that the death penalty would be an appropriate
penalty than those jurors who were not privy to the death
qualification process.443 This places the attorneys back at square
one: confronting a conviction-prone, death-prone jury.
Second, “[d]etermining the proper questions to ask jurors in
order to uncover bias remains difficult.”444 Plus, the semiimpromptu445 nature of death qualification means that defense
attorneys often overlook the questions they should be asking, even
with the structure the Colorado Method provides. As a result,
attorneys often find themselves “asking truly biased juror questions
that lead [the juror] away from an admission of bias and not toward
one.”446 The demeaning tone often elicited from leading questions
“telegraph[s] to the juror that the answers she has given to counsel
are the ‘wrong’ answers,”447 causing the individual to “conform to
the underlying presupposition of the question” or push back against
any perceived aggression from the defense attorney.448 Simply put,
“[l]eading questions are of minimal value in weeding out jury bias
and, by their nature, elicit only the prospective jurors’ own
perceptions of their biases which are generally not accurate
information.”449
3. The Colorado Method Relies Too Heavily on
Rehabilitation
Frankly, during death qualification, “neither litigant is trying
to choose ‘impartial’ jurors,” but rather, each side is focused on
strategically eliminating anyone could be “sympathetic to the other

EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCOL. 88, 95 (Jan. 1978).
443. Haney II, supra note 296, at 128 (stating that jurors who were exposed
to “a set of facts in [a] hypothetical penalty phase” during the death qualification
process were “significantly more likely” to believe that the death penalty would
be an appropriate penalty than those jurors who were not privy to the death
qualification process).
444. Christopher A. Cosper, Rehabilitation of the Juror Rehabilitation
Doctrine, 37 GA. L. REV. 1471, 1485 (2003).
445. See Brett Godfrey, Advanced Voir Dire and Jury Selection (Part 1),
GODFREY
JOHNSON,
gojolaw.com/advanced-voir-dire-jury-selection/
[perma.cc/JKZ6-MRQB] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019) (stating that “[m]any
advanced practitioners consider voir dire to be more of a magical art than a
formulated technique”).
446. Broda-Bahm II, supra note 382.
447. Roan, supra note 116.
448. Shuy, supra note 371, at 207–08.
449. Matlon, supra note 104, at 4. See MICKENBERG, supra note 366, at 6
(stating that “[l]eading questions will get the juror to verbally agree with you
but won’t let you learn anything about the juror”) “Voir dire is not crossexamination.” Id.
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side, hopefully leaving only those biased for him.”450 As such, capital
voir dire can quickly devolve “into a game of cat and mouse . . . with
the members of the venire caught in the middle.”451 Rehabilitative
questioning not only ensures this devolution, but potentially
violates “the constitutional right to an impartial jury.”452
“When a juror is challenged based on actual bias, opposing
counsel is traditionally afforded the opportunity to re-question the
juror.”453 These “post-challenge inquiries are colloquially known as
‘rehabilitation’ of the juror.”454 “Rehabilitation” is a misnomer,
though; the goal should not be to change a juror’s biased
perspective, but rather, should be “for the purpose of clarification or
elaboration.”455 Unfortunately, the tool has devolved into “getting a
juror to change a biased attitude.”456
Proponents of rehabilitative questioning view the process as
“peeling away the skin of an onion and getting to the raw truth,”457
and, of course, some level of rehabilitation is necessary for a
competent voir dire strategy.458 In fact, when used appropriately,
rehabilitation may help reduce the premature perception of a
defendant’s guilt.459 However, an “aggressive and intimidating
approach to rehabilitation is fatal to seating a fair and impartial
jury,” and otherwise inconsistent with the Colorado Method’s
initiative.460 As public defender Ira Mickenberg observed, “[i]f a
juror gives a ‘bad’ answer we rush to correct or rehabilitate him to
make sure the rest of the panel is not infected by the bias.”461 When
used excessively, rehabilitation essentially walks back jurors from
the edge of elimination.462 Proper rehabilitative questions should be
“purely investigative in nature,” but in practice, rehabilitation often
results in jurors “renounce[ing] their beliefs.’”463 Jurors’ “deeply
held personal views on capital punishment are picked apart and
450. Babcock, supra note 114, at 551 (emphasis in original).
451. Roan, supra note 116.
452. Cosper, supra note 444, at 1497.
453. Roan, supra note 116.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. (citing O’Dell v. Miller, 565 S.E.2d 407, 412 (W. Va. 2002); Daniel J.
Sheehan, Jr. & Jill C. Adler, Voir Dire: Knowledge is Power, 61 TEX. B.J. 630,
633 (1998)).
457. Godfrey, supra note 445.
458. Blume, Johnson, & Threlkeld, supra note 142, at 1263 (citing Jaffe,
supra note 370, at 42).
459. Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of
Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 212, 220 (July 31, 2009).
460. Roan, supra note 116.
461. MICKENBERG, supra note 366, at 4.
462. Cosper, supra note 444, at 1488 (stating that “rehabilitative
questioning seeks to ‘persuade’ the juror that he could go against his previously
disclosed bias.”).
463. Roan, supra note 116.
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used as a litmus test of their ability to serve as a member of the
jury.”464 Often, rehabilitation is “nothing more” than either counsel
or the court “trying to talk a juror out of the position that has been
established by counsel’s questions and exploiting the juror’s fear
and respect for the judiciary to do so.”465
The Colorado Method seeks to minimize the elimination of
veniremen whose death-penalty opposition appears unequivocal by
relying heavily on rehabilitation.466 Ultimately, this results in the
manipulation of jurors’ beliefs in order to fit the needs of counsel.
Thus, vulnerable jurors find themselves feeling judged, causing
them to modify their answers which, in turn, leads to unpredictable
verdicts and a huge waste of resources. The fact of the matter is
this: clarification does not equate to rehabilitation, and a
rehabilitated juror should be excused regardless how much of an
asset he would be to the defense.467 Instead, by relying on
rehabilitation, the Colorado Method frustrates voir dire and
eliminates “the opportunity to use the cause challenge for its true
and intended purpose: to remove a juror who cannot reliably be fair
in evaluating the facts of the case.”468 As it stands, the Colorado
Method’s reliance on rehabilitation perpetuates the qualification
and eventual seating of biased jurors.469 To again invoke the wise
words of public defender Ira Mickenberg, “[w]hen a juror tells us
something bad, there are only two things we should do: Believe
them [or] [g]et rid of them.”470
In sum, the Colorado Method has proved its ability to provide
a workable map for defense attorneys to best navigate the daunting
process of capital voir dire. When taking a closer look, it appears
that the Method has room for improvement with regard to three
areas: First, the seven-point scale has too much overlap; Second, the
Colorado Method uses faulty questioning techniques; Third, the
Colorado Method relies too heavily on rehabilitation.

464. DIETER, supra note 100.
465. Roan, supra note 116.
466. Haney I, supra note 152, at 136.
467. See Cosper, supra note 444, at 1471 (providing an example of a potential
juror who “should [have been] removed from the pool of potential jurors because
she ha[d] demonstrated a bias in favor of one of the parties,” but was not
removed because of “one simple reason: juror rehabilitation.”). As the author
witnessed during the Christensen voir dire, rehabilitation can transform a
seemingly unqualified venireperson into a qualified juror.
468. Broda-Bahm II, supra note 382, at 1.
469. Cosper, supra note 444, at 1476–77.
470. MICKENBERG, supra note 366, at 5. In the words of Maya Angelou,
“[w]hen someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time.” Maya
Angelou (@DrMayaAngelou), TWITTER (June 12, 2015, 11:01AM),
twitter.com/drmayaangelou/status/609390085604311040?lang=en.
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IV. PROPOSAL
To be truly successful, voir dire “must elicit truthful and
thoughtful answers” so that the court and attorneys can best
determine the juror’s “ability to consider the evidence fairly and
impartially.”471 Even at its best, though, death qualification is
detrimentally inadequate at its main task of “weeding out
unqualified jurors.”472 To no fault of the Colorado Method, as long
as the death qualification process is implemented, its processing
effects will skew the fitness of a capital jury. The solution is as
simple as it is impractical: the death qualification process should be
eliminated. Despite the procedure not being federally mandated,
this is unlikely to happen.473 Still, “there is room within the system
for modification.”474
Undoubtedly, “[m]ore must be done to address death
qualification’s profound failure to provide capital defendants with
any semblance of an impartial jury, or we must recognize the futility
of the attempt and dismantle the machinery of death for good.”475
Until such change is possible, however, the Colorado Method is in
the best position to seek attainable improvements to the jury
selection process. As such, the Colorado Method should consider: (A)
simplifying its preliminary ranking scale, (B) supporting true
bifurcation, (C) prioritizing jurors’ cultural identities, and (D)
making the Colorado Method more accessible to the public.

A. The Preliminary Ranking Scale Should Be
Simplified
First and foremost, the Colorado Method’s seven-point
preliminary ranking scale should be simplified to a five-point scale.
Not only will this further increase efficiency when preparing for voir
dire, but this will also afford defense lawyers extra time to focus on
other aspects of jury selection. By signaling when rehabilitation is
acceptable, the five-point scale also reduces its aggressive use. The
scale should be re-written as follows:476
471. Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 361, at 516.
472. Blume, Johnson, & Threlkeld, supra note 142, at 1211.
473. Motion to Establish Jury Selection Procedures for Defendant, supra
note 434, at 5.
474. Cox & Tanford, supra note 292.
475. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 806. To be sure, abolishing the death penalty
altogether would solve each aforementioned problem in a heartbeat. Moreover,
the death penalty should be abolished. See GARRETT, supra note 58, at 1
(arguing that “[w]e can abolish [the death penalty] not in a matter of
generations, but in a matter of years. And it is imperative that we do so, for its
abolition will be a catalyst for reforming our criminal justice system.”).
476. The rewriting of these categories is based upon the knowledge the
author gained as a judicial extern during the Christensen case and the seven
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1. Automatic Life: a juror ranked as a “1” would automatically
vote for a life sentence (whether under the facts of the specific case
at hand or any other case) because there is no way their conscience
would allow them to cast a vote for putting someone to death. This
person is vocal and adamant about their disdain for capital
punishment and likely offers some kind of justification against the
death penalty without being substantially prompted by counsel. A
juror in this category may have had personal experiences with the
justice system or the death penalty in a way that makes them
completely unwilling to consider it as a sentencing option.
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances are irrelevant to this
juror; they firmly believe that people should not have a role in
taking the life of another. A juror who is so against the death
penalty is impaired, and thus any veniremen categorized as a “1”
should be excused without attempting rehabilitation.
2. Life-Leaning: a juror ranked as a “2” would be more inclined
to vote for life than for death, though they are not as steadfast in
those beliefs as a juror ranked as a “1.” This “life-leaning” juror
may be hesitant or unsure of their beliefs, but is considerate of the
solemnity necessary to deliberate a death penalty case. Any
hesitation here is negated by the person’s willingness to consider
both aggravating and mitigating evidence. When a potential juror
is not so against the death penalty that they become impaired, but
would prefer a life sentence over a death sentence, that juror should
be categorized as a “2” and the defense team should prepare a
defense to a potential challenge from the prosecution.
Rehabilitation should only be attempted if the prosecution engages
in rehabilitative questioning first.
3. Wildcard: a juror ranked as a “3” is a person who does not
hold a firm belief one way or another; they may be somewhat
frustrating in their inability to commit to a position. Rather than
aggressively rehabilitating this person into a category favoring life
or death, these jurors should be ranked as ambiguous. This
identifier suggests that counsel should not assume they can predict
the juror’s actions; in a sense, they are the wildcard. However, it
is also clear that this person is not impaired. Light rehabilitation
may be appropriate for a Wildcard juror in the sense that they do
not hold a firm belief to be impermissibly walked back from. If
rehabilitation is unsuccessful, cultural questioning becomes
necessary to coax important attitudes from this juror.477 Inevitably,
the prosecution may also prioritize this juror, so defense counsel
categories of the Colorado Method as provided by Rubenstein, supra note 19.
477. See infra Part IV(C) (urging the increase of cultural questioning and
recognition).
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should prepare accordingly.
4. Death-Leaning: a juror ranked as a “4” is more inclined to vote
for death than for life, though they are not an automatic vote for
death. They are generally comfortable with the imposition of capital
punishment in society, and respect the death penalty as a
sometimes warranted tool of justice. This person may have had a
personal experience relevant to the case at hand, and they place a
strong sense of goodwill in governmental authority. Death-leaning
jurors may speak of “an eye for an eye,” but they do not
necessarily view capital punishment as appropriate in every
situation; they are open to considering both aggravating and
mitigating evidence. While preparing a cause challenge against this
juror, cultural questioning is still important in case this juror is
seated on the final jury.
5. Automatic Death: a juror ranked as a “5” will automatically
impose a death sentence for a defendant convicted of capital
murder. They see criminality in black and white terms and believe
that capital punishment is a useful and necessary tool to better
society. Automatic death jurors think highly of the government and
are unwilling to listen to any mitigation. Because of this, jurors
categorized as a “5” are impaired and must be excused. The
defense team should not spend too much time on these jurors once
they provide a clear reason to warrant disqualification, and should
move directly to challenge.

Additionally, defense counsel should note whenever a potential
juror has been rehabilitated in any way and how such rehabilitation
happened. This is critical to understanding how strong the person’s
beliefs were, how impressionable they are to differing viewpoints,
and what kind of reasoning they are most susceptible to.
Ultimately, downsizing to a straightforward five-point scale will
decrease any time spent mulling over ambiguities, and the more
time defense teams have to “explore a juror’s attitudes,” the higher
their chances of selecting the most beneficial jurors.478

B. The Colorado Method Should Push for True
Bifurcation
Bifurcation, literally defined as “[t]o separate into two parts,
esp. for convenience,”479 is the requirement that capital trials be
divided into separate guilt and penalty phases.480 This “procedural
478. Mullin, supra note 96, at 146.
479. Bifurcate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2016).
480. Cheng, supra note 77, at 40.
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bifurcation” necessarily results in “two distinct, and in many ways
contradictory, domains of knowledge,” with law “on one side of the
bifurcated divide” and morality on the other.481 However, the
“reliance by the Supreme Court on bifurcation as a restraint on
arbitrariness has largely been misplaced”482 since any benefits of
bifurcation are illusory when a single jury is required to evaluate
both the defense strategy and penalty arguments.483
Bifurcation “has been criticized for decades.”484 When the same
jury determines both guilt and penalty, “the situation is not
different from a unitary trial,” and the intended procedural
safeguard is rendered useless.485 Specifically, “having just heard the
grisly details of this defendant’s death-eligible crime and having
just found this defendant guilty, it would be asking far too much to
imagine that these jurors can divorce themselves from their
context” and decide the appropriate sentence fairly.486
Unfortunately, the unitary jury of a bifurcated trial “maximizes the
skewing effects of death qualification, ensuring that the scales of
justice tilt in favor of the prosecution.”487
The logical solution, then, is separate juries. Known as “true
bifurcation,” this procedure composes a different set of jurors to
independently decide the guilt and penalty hearings.488 Because the
downfalls of a unitary jury “combine[] with death qualification to
tilt the scales even more firmly toward guilt and death than death
qualification alone,” true bifurcation is a necessary and welcome
change.489 Despite neither the federal nor any state’s “capital
statutory scheme contemplate[ing] the impaneling of separate
juries,”490 attention to the intersection of death qualification and the
unitary jury is increasing nationwide.491 Actually, true bifurcation
is already accepted when multiple criminal defendants are tried
together.492
In the capital context, when Senator Mitt Romney was
Governor of Massachusetts, his Council on Capital Punishment
recommended that a capital defendant should have the right “to
request the selection of a new jury for the sentencing stage.”493
481. Id.
482. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37 at 146–47.
483. Id. at 147.
484. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 794 (citing HANS ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON
JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARDS CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 51 (1968)).
485. Id.
486. Id. at 807.
487. Id. at 793–94.
488. Cheng, supra note 77, at 48.
489. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 794.
490. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37, at 146.
491. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 772.
492. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37 at 149.
493. Joseph L. Hoffman, et al, Report of the Governor’s Council on Capital
Punishment, 80 IND. L.J. 1, 16, (2005).
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Despite the Massachusetts House rejecting the bill, in 2005, the
First, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits “ruled on their respective trial
judges’ bifurcation of capital juries into (1) non-death-qualified,
guilt-phase juries and (2) death-qualified sentencing-phase
juries.”494 Additionally, despite Indiana’s death penalty statute
requiring that the same jury hear both phases, the Indiana
Supreme Court “does not interpret that provision to apply where it
is impracticable.”495 Recent developments like these suggest that
“the courts may be ready to give meaningful consideration” to truly
bifurcating a capital trial.496 This could mean a huge step toward a
truly fair trial for capital defendants.
In a very real sense, impaneling two juries would allow a
capital defendant to “truly determine where his case is strongest
and to make that case to the jury in a way that best puts the
prosecution to its proof.”497 The benefits of true bifurcation are
abundant:
First, seating an entirely separate sentencing jury obviates the need
to perform a full, comprehensive death qualification of the liabilityphase jury. Instead, the liability-phase jury could be asked a single,
neutrally-phrased question intended to suss out tendencies toward
nullification.498 The operative issue is “whether their feelings about
the death penalty would prevent them from considering all of the
evidence presented for and against the defendant throughout the
trial.”499 Thus, potential jurors whose feelings would prevent them
from finding impartially on guilt may be detected, while avoiding
talk of punishment and its attendant presumption of guilt.
Second, waiting to death-qualify a separate sentencing jury means
the liability jury is not death-qualified. This change would remove
the taint of prosecution-proneness injected into the proceedings by
death qualification’s over-exclusion, not only be demographic group,
but also by ideology . . . . In addition, this approach would eliminate
the taint of inculcating jurors pretrial with the idea that this
494. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 774. See United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d
277, 282 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a defendant has no “no right . . . to choose
a unitary or bifurcated jury”); see also United States v. Green, 407 F.3d 434.
441–42 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that “a single, properly constituted jury will hear
both phases of a federal capital trial unless circumstances definitively rule out
that option.”); see also United States v. Young, 424 F.3d 499, 506–07 (6th Cir.
2005) (holding that a defendant is not permitted “to adopt a dual-jury procedure
in federal capital cases.”).
495. Sites, supra note 268, at 42 (citing Burris v. State, 642 N.E.2d 961 (Ind.
1994)).
496. Bowers & Foglia, supra note 27, at 86.
497. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37, at 151.
498. Rozelle II, supra note 320, at 682–90 (asserting that systemic sweeping
over excludes and removes many more persons as death penalty opponents than
the law permits).
499. Id.
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defendant is guilty and that the only real question before them is
whether they have the mettle to sentence him to death.500

“[A]ll principled executioners” have the duty to “insist on
reform,” and, currently, the Colorado Method may be the most
principled strategy for capital jury selection.501 Thus, the Colorado
Method should include a provision encouraging defense counsel to
file a “motion to sever the guilt-innocence and penalty phases and
use a jury which has not been death-qualified for the guiltinnocence phase.”502 In expanding upon the Massachusetts
Council’s work, University of Denver Assistant Professor Sam
Kamin and Suffolk University Law School Associate Professor
Jeffrey J. Pokorak propose the following approach:
A capital defendant should be given the option of electing to have a
separate jury impaneled for the sentencing phase of the trial, in the
event that the guilt-phase jury convicts him of capital murder. The
defendant should be allowed to exercise this option either prior to
the guilt phase of the trial or after conviction of capital murder. If
the defendant makes a pretrial election to have a separate jury
impaneled for sentencing, then the guilt-phase jury will not be
death-qualified. If the defendant decides to defer the election until
after conviction of capital murder, then the guilt-phase jury will be
death-qualified.503

When “the only barrier standing in the way of increasing
fairness in our capital punishment system is statutory,” change
becomes not only agreeable, but necessary.504 Until these motions
pick up speed, proponents of the Colorado Method must push for
statutory change with regard to capital bifurcation.505
True bifurcation may unfortunately mean increased time and
effort at the capital defense attorney’s expense, but above all else,
it “offers capital defendants, if not a fair trial, then at least a trial
that is more fair.”506 Further, any additional costs related to true
bifurcation would be “relatively modest,” considering that true
bifurcation “saves the cost of death-qualifying all liability juries,
and incurs the additional costs of a second jury only in those cases
where the defendant is convicted.”507 And although “separate juries
may necessitate presenting certain evidence twice (as when
evidence presented to the liability jury is also relevant to

500. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 796.
501. Id. at 771.
502. Sites, supra note 268, at 42.
503. Kamin & Pokorak, supra note 37, at 132.
504. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 801.
505. Id. at 798 (stating that the Federal Death Penalty Act will typically
prohibit true bifurcation under presently existing statutory schemes).
506. Id. at 793.
507. Id. at 802.
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sentencing), this is already a common phenomenon.”508 As Justice
Marshall pointed out in Lockhart v. McCree, “it cannot fairly be said
that the costs of accommodating a defendant’s constitutional rights
under these circumstances are prohibitive, or even significant.”509
So, while true bifurcation cannot negate the full detriments of the
death qualification process, the undeniable “need to bridge the
rupture of bifurcation therefore must become a conscious aspect of
the overall defense strategy.”510
Abolishing the death penalty, or even its death qualification
procedure, “may be out of reach in the current political climate.”511
But, by advocating for true bifurcation, the Colorado Method has
the ability to “lighten the thumb that the unitary, death-qualified
jury lays on Lady Justice’s scales.”512 “[T]rue bifurcation is a
commonsense, achievable improvement in our capital punishment
system’s fairness,”513 and the Colorado Method should make waves
to ensure such an improvement happens.

C. The Colorado Method Should Increase Cultural
Recognition
An attorney’s strategy for each potential juror “depends on
the quality of the information” they elicit from each individual.514
The “on-the-ground reality” of death qualification, however, is that
“many capital defense teams fail to investigate the cultural factors
that have shaped a client’s life, and do not convey those factors
effectively to jurors.”515 In order to relate the defendant’s story in a
way the jury can undeniably connect to, defense attorneys must be
culturally competent in both the defendant and the individual
jurors’ lives.516
508. Id.
509. Id. at 803 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 205 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). Justice Marshall continued, “[a]ny suggestion that
capital defendants will benefit from a single jury thus is more than
disingenuous. It is cruel.” Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
510. Cheng, supra note 77, at 55.
511. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 775. Then again, death penalty abolition
may not be such a pipe dream after all, as Brandon Garrett notes that “[t]he
death penalty in the United States is at the end of its rope.” GARRETT, supra
note 58, at 1.
512. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 775.
513. Id. at 806.
514. Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 361, at 516.
515. Sarma, supra note 335, at 913. Of course, culture is “notoriously
difficult to define,” as it “is a complex and nuanced convergence of …
innumerable characteristics.” Id. at 910.
516. Id. at 912. “[W]inning over capital jurors” is nonetheless a daunting
task “because defense counsel must confront the cultural chasm that separates
nearly all capital jurors from the death penalty defendants they must judge.”
Id. at 914.
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A jury’s “genuine understanding of a capital defendant’s
background and social history and their willingness to grasp that
evidence’s mitigating significance is what determines whether they
will choose life over death.”517 This genuine understanding cannot
be realized through hypothetical or open-ended questions, but
through cultural recognition. Cultural differences can severely
impact “lawyers’ and clients’ capacities to understand one another’s
goals, behaviors and communications,” leading to jurors attributing
“different meanings to the same set of facts.”518 Therefore,
incorporating a cultural focus into capital voir dire is important for
two reasons: “(1) a well-communicated cultural understanding of
the client can help jurors understand him; and (2) the defense
team’s understanding of prospective jurors’ cultural underpinnings
will enable them to select the most favorable jurors and present
evidence more effectively.”519
Jurors “who can culturally relate to the client in a meaningful
way are far more likely to receive the mitigation narrative with an
open mind.”520 For this reason, cultural questioning goes beyond
determining whether jurors can meaningfully consider mitigation,
and seeks to reveal if and how prospective jurors can directly relate
to a particular set of facts or circumstances.521 Significantly, if a
juror feels they have “come to know, and to a certain extent,
understand” the defendant, he then becomes “complicated, real, and
human,” making it increasingly difficult for that juror to “cast aside”
his life.522 In past studies, “[t]he more a juror reported having felt
sympathy or pity for the defendant, having found the defendant
likeable as a person, or having imagined being in the defendant’s
situation, the more likely she was to cast her first vote for a sentence
of life imprisonment.”523
For the Colorado Method, “[c]ulture need not be a separate or
altogether new consideration; instead, it is a concept that can be
subsumed within the broader strategy” that the Method provides.524
Counsel should avoid posing “prescriptive or even judgmental”
questions but should instead attempt to connect the source of any
bias to the cultural foundation it stems from. Bidish J. Sarma,
517. Lynch & Haney, supra note 348, at 93.
518. Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence
in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL C. REV. 33, 42 (2001).
519. Sarma, supra note 335, at 909. Properly incorporating culture into the
jury selection process “can be a matter of life and death in capital cases because
it has the potential to influence the jury’s ultimate determination.” Id.
520. Id. at 934.
521. Id. at 927–28. Non-culturally diverse juries “deliberate less critically
and the jurors are more likely to share the same view of the evidence.” Id. at
911.
522. Id. at 913.
523. Garvey, supra note 281, at 62.
524. Sarma, supra note 335, at 925.
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former Deputy Director of the Capital Appeals Project in New
Orleans,525 elucidates how the Colorado Method can best
incorporate cultural voir dire:
For example, if the client was taken away from his parents at a
young age, counsel may want to ask whether jurors know
individuals who have grown up under similar circumstances or
have done so themselves. Or, if the client witnessed the violent
death of a loved one, counsel may want to find out if prospective
jurors have had a similar experience. Not every question needs to
be related to mitigation; the defense lawyer could simple ask “getto-know-you” questions early in voir dire. For example, she may ask
if any jurors are the oldest sibling in the immediate family, or if
they ever worked in the same job as the client.526

In this way, cultural questioning may also increase minority
representation in death qualified juries. A juror’s cultural identity
heavily influences their perceptions of guilt or innocence, and thus,
the presence of minority jurors on juries can aide the defense by
translating the “cultural meaning[] of acts and words” in a way most
favorable to the defendant.527 Moreover, preserving juror diversity
“is of central importance both to the defendant, who is entitled to
the collective judgment of the community, and to the community
itself, whose members are entitled to an equal say on matters so
fundamental as criminal justice.”528 Defense attorneys should
therefore utilize “a method of selection that increases the
demographic and attitudinal representativeness of the capital jury
sample.”529 Cultural questioning can do just that.

D. The Colorado Method Should be More Publicly
Available
The Colorado Method provides an invaluable cheat sheet to
mastering “one of the most difficult yet crucial skills for capital
defense lawyers.”530 However, the only way to immerse oneself in its
methodology is to attend an annual $500 seminar in Colorado.531
Information on the method is otherwise shielded from the public.532
525. Bidish Sarma, HUFFPOST (Feb. 20, 2019), huffpost.com/author/bidishsarma [perma.cc/4F4R-UENR].
526. Sarma, supra note 335, at 928.
527. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 1261, 1285 (2000).
528. Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, supra note 316, at 54.
529. Cox & Tanford, supra note 292.
530. National Capital Voir Dire Training Program, supra note 201.
531. Id. As an aside, the impact and forced remoteness of COVID-19 has
undoubtedly made access to the Colorado Method even more elusive.
532. Lepir, supra note 13, at 397 (stating “the Colorado Method is both
proprietary and an important part of trial strategy for capital defense counsel”).
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Not only did this make researching and writing this Comment
frustratingly difficult, but this fact presents a larger implication
regarding the capitalization of tools intended to further the public
good.
Capitalization and collection of profits should not—and
cannot—take precedence over the dissemination of information,
especially when such information has the potential to save lives.533
Because of this, the Colorado Method should be made available to
the public, defense attorneys, and law students alike. To withhold
this tool of justice is to perpetuate the systemic issues with capital
jury selection and conceal, arguably, the best legal advocacy
available to criminal defendants. Moreover, death penalty cases are
unfathomably taxing on the attorneys who try them; David Wymore
himself admits, “[i]t’s a horrible business . . . Never should have
gotten involved in it.”534 But access to the Colorado Method could
significantly lighten that load, if only by providing a navigational
tool or a sense of structure.
Without a doubt, David Wymore has changed the game with
regard to capital jury selection procedures, and he deserves the
utmost credit. Nonetheless, he may stand to recall the wise words
of Justice Hugo L. Black so long ago: “There can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has.”535
V. CONCLUSION
Since Colonial times, the United States has allowed for certain
crimes to be punishable by death, but the rules that govern the
parameters of death-eligible crimes have given the criminal justice
system severe whiplash for just as long.536 The most detrimental
part of the capital punishment scheme, death qualification, directly
changes the composition of a capital jury in shocking ways. Among
other pitfalls, a death qualified jury is conviction-prone, deathprone, unrepresentative, biased, and impartial—everything a jury
should not be.537 Faced with these detriments of the current capital
Interestingly enough, Wymore himself has noted that “the ugliest part of the
death penalty [is] the part that’s not talked about.” Greene, supra note 6.
Because the methodology is kept under wraps, a huge debt of gratitude is owed
to Matthew Rubenstein and his publication.
533. To clarify, the National College of Capital Voir Dire is a non-profit
organization. No one involved in the organization, including David Wymore,
receive a profit of any kind for their work involving the Colorado Method.
Additionally, NCCVD hosts fundraisers each year to provide scholarships to
lawyers unable to afford the seminar’s tuition or travel and lodging expenses.
534. Greene, supra note 6 (statement of David Wymore).
535. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
536. Costanzo & White, supra note 127, at 2–3 (explaining that “[p]rogress
of the movement to abolish the death penalty has been slow and erratic”).
537. Haney II, supra note 296.
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jury selection procedures, Colorado public defender David Wymore
created a blueprint of how to maximize life verdicts through
structured voir dire.
Wymore’s Colorado Method has successfully spared some of the
most infamous capital defendants from death since 1995, including
James Holmes and Brendt Christensen. To protect the interests of
countless more capital defendants, the Colorado Method should
consider simplifying its preliminary ranking scale, supporting true
bifurcation, prioritizing uncovering jurors’ cultural identities, and
making the Colorado Method more accessible to the public. In doing
so, the Colorado Method has the potential to solidify its name as the
threshold way to conduct capital jury selection nationwide.
Crucially, the more attorneys able to master the technique, the
more death-eligible defendants may be saved.
Today, public support for capital punishment has fallen to its
lowest level in forty-five years, and most people now prefer life
without parole rather than the death penalty for convicted
murderers.538 While a sure step in the right direction, the fact that
“state-sanctioned murder”539 is still an available sentencing option
means that America’s punishment schemes still have a long way to
go. However, considering that lasting opposition to imposing the
death penalty comes “less from giving people more information
about the death penalty and more from giving them–and convincing
them that they truly have available–a meaningful alternative to
death that both punishes the defendant and keeps him or her off
the streets for good,”540 it is clear why Wymore’s Method “is now a
key element in death penalty training across the country.”541
Moving forward, research on the effects of the capital jury
selection process must continue with full force but, more
importantly, defense attorneys must proactively push for legislative
change. So long as death remains “a permissible punishment,”542 it
is on those fighting its permissibility to ensure capital defendants
are afforded the fairest possible trial.543 In the meantime, the
Colorado Method simply furthers this mission.

538. Jones, supra note 63. See GARRETT, supra note 58, at 1 (recognizing
that “[t]he decline and fall of the death penalty will save lives, but more
important it provides an opportunity to revive the broken American justice
system.”).
539. Michael Coard, Death penalty: State-sanctioned murder, PHILA. TRIB.
(Feb. 27, 2016), phillytrib.com/commentary/death-penalty-state-sanctionedmurder/article_9ae8ab3b-1c63-50c3-b03f-9286130b630c.html [perma.cc/CJ8TXC3K].
540. Eisenberg, Garvey, & Wells, supra note 108, at 379.
541. GARRETT, supra note 58, at 54.
542. Rozelle I, supra note 80, at 807.
543. Just as “[t]he criminal justice system doesn’t give up its prey very
easily,” neither should death penalty abolitionists. Reid, supra note 181
(statement of David Wymore).

